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ABOuT ThE AuThOR
1ExEcutivE summary
This report explores the safety and security risks associated with the massive expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activity in the Asia Pacific region. The pursuit of 
national and commercial objectives is generating the convergence of 
wider interests and uncertainties, and therefore significant and often 
shared risks. Risk mitigating options for action are presented that need 
to be urgently and collaboratively considered by multiple actors: states, 
regional cooperative entities, and industry.
 Many major offshore oil and gas safety incidents around the world 
have been attributed to man-induced hazards resulting from human 
error, technology or equipment failures, regulatory failures, or a combi-
nation of these. Further, the Asia Pacific region has the highest incidence 
of natural hazards in the world from extreme weather events and seismic 
activity, with the former projected to increase due to climate change. 
The possibility of armed conflict at sea, law and order issues, increasing 
maritime user intensity, decommissioned installations, and jurisdictional 
uncertainty, where the geographical limits of national responsibilities 
and obligations for safety and security may be unclear, add to security 
and safety concerns in economically and strategically important, envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas.
 In the Asia Pacific, measures to deal with large-scale offshore oil 
and gas safety and security incidents are often not well developed. As 
evident elsewhere in the world, responses to catastrophic accidents with 
significant environmental and human security consequences are unlikely 
to be adequate. Vulnerabilities arise from the lack of capacity and the 
lack of coordination regimes to prevent, respond to and recover from 
incidents; and the lack of cooperative arrangements for maritime safety 
and security.
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 Key messages from the West Atlas (Australia, 2009) Commissioner’s 
Report and the Deepwater Horizon (United States, 2010) Commission of 
Inquiry that should resonate across the Asia Pacific include: lax regula-
tion and industrial complacency, combined with driving political and 
commercial expediency, work together to build cumulative risks that 
ultimately create circumstances where systemic, organisationally induced 
accidents are certain to occur; and effective risk management requires 
partnerships between regulators and those being regulated, between 
governments and industry, where each partner performs its role dili-
gently and with integrity. Governance arrangements and relationships 
are critical.
 There is little evidence so far that all regional governments and 
industry are paying attention to the rising, cumulative risks to safety and 
security that increased offshore oil and gas activity is generating. Regional 
states appear to be consumed by the rush to claim and exploit as much 
of the valuable resources as possible. Collaboration between states and 
other actors, particularly regional cooperative entities and industry, is 
necessary, presents mutually beneficial opportunities, and is therefore 
logical. The strategic, economic and environmental interests of regional 
states and other actors will be enhanced by pursuing cooperative activity 
at sea; they will remain diminished until this occurs.
 Given the extent of the safety and security uncertainties and the 
lack of cooperative arrangements an uncomfortable conclusion must be 
drawn: offshore oil and gas disasters in the Asia Pacific are inevitable. 
The only questions that remain to be answered are where, when and 
what the scale of the disasters will be, and how effective response and 
recovery arrangements will prove to be.
 The onus lies with regional governments, cooperative entities and 
industry, supported by extra-regional governments and entities with 
interests at stake, to ensure that the risks are fully understood and that 
appropriate mitigation arrangements are put in place. Cooperative 
mechanisms, arrangements, protocols, policies, equipments and training 
need to be prepared and tested before major incidents occur.
 Asia Pacific regional cooperative bodies and individual states, in con-
cert with industry partners, are urged to consider the following actions:
 1. Offshore oil and gas safety and security should feature as a major 
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and discrete agenda item with regional safety, security, economic, 
environmental and disaster response cooperative bodies. Enti-
ties like ARF, EAS, APEC, ASEAN and SAARC, and relevant 
subordinate agencies, should commission independent expert 
working groups directed to review and report recommendations 
and options to develop regional measures.
 2. A significant and essential initial activity of such working groups 
should be to commission strategic, all-factors offshore oil and 
gas benchmark risk assessments to establish objective bases for 
individual and cooperative risk management initiatives.
 3. UNCLOS Articles 122 and 123 provide an international legisla-
tive foundation for targeted regional cooperative and national 
initiatives that should be acted upon in the South China Sea, 
noting the majority of Asia Pacific states covered by this review 
have ratified UNCLOS (see Chapter 5) and the South China Sea 
is generally recognised by littoral states as a semi-enclosed sea 
(see Chapter 3).
 4. States should, as a matter of priority, accede to relevant mari-
time and marine safety, security and environmental protection 
conventions and protocols. Establishing associated national 
legislation, regulations and capabilities, and regional cooperative 
arrangements, would follow. Specifically, regional states should 
establish and where they already exist, enhance regional coopera-
tive regimes to deal with:
a. maritime search and rescue;
b. marine environmental protection including pollution, dump-
ing and decommissioning of offshore installations;
c. maritime safety and security arrangements to include inci-
dents at sea protocols;
d. establishing common, best practice approaches to offshore 
oil and gas safety and security regulation, to include industry 
engagement, this may include establishing regional govern-
ment-industry cooperative agencies to provide advice and 
coordination;
e. develop individual state and collective offshore arrangements 
and capabilities for disaster management to include preven-
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tion of, recovery from and response to offshore oil and gas 
incidents; and
f. enhancing and sharing scientific information that include 
marine science, oceanographic, hydrographic, seismic, and 
meteorology data in order to better understand and therefore 
prevent and prepare responses and recovery arrangements to 
deal with the environmental impacts of incidents.
 5. Encourage regional states to resolve or agree to set aside mari-
time boundary delimitation disputes in the interests of mutually 
beneficial economic, security, safety and environmental out-
comes.
 6. Encourage all parties involved in offshore oil and gas safety and 
security, including states and industry, to adopt internation-
ally recognised and proven, best practice risk management 
approaches. Effective risk management requires partnerships 
between the regulator and those being regulated, between 
government and industry, where each partner performs its role 
diligently and with integrity.
5Chapter 1
OFFsHOrE OiL aND Gas 
ExPLOratiON aND ExPLOitatiON 
iN tHE asia PaciFic
Massive increases in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploi-tation activity and investment in the Asia Pacific region are driven by economic growth and the associated rising demand 
for energy in Asia. Economic growth in China and India is predicted to 
continue at an average of greater than five per cent per annum through 
to 2035.1 While coal and nuclear power will meet much of the energy 
increase the demand for oil will also rise. The largest increase in demand 
will be for natural gas with non-OECD Asia,2 led by China and India, 
likely to increase its share of world natural gas consumption from 10 per 
cent in 2008 to 19 per cent in 2035; gas consumption volume is forecast 
to increase by an average of 3.9 per cent annually.3
 This review explores the safety and security risks associated with the 
expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activity. 
The focus is on Asia Pacific maritime domains, also referred to as the 
Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the vast and strategically impor-
tant geographic construct whose central feature is the confluence of the 
world’s two great oceans.4 The geographical coverage of the Asia Pacific 
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 
2011 (IEO2011), viewed 9 August 2012, <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/
pdf/0484(2011).pdf>, p. 19.
2 The only Asian OECD member nations are Japan and the Republic of Korea.
3 EIA, op. cit., p. 48–49.
4 Dennis Rumley, Timothy Doyle and Sanjay Chaturvedi, “‘Securing’ the Indian 
Ocean? Competing regional security constructions”, Journal of the Indian Ocean 
Region, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2012, pp. 1–20. The authors identify three “competing” 
regional security constructs: an “all-embracing concept of an Indian Ocean 
region; a more limited “East Indian Ocean”; and an “Indo-Pacific concept that 
emphasises the pre-eminence of regional naval power” where India is a dominant 
player and extra-regional powers like the United States and China play important 
roles (pp. 2–3).
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region addressed here extends from Russia’s Pacific coast south through 
the western Pacific Ocean to the northeast Indian Ocean including 
waters to the northwest of Australia, the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal 
and India. A primary area of interest is the South China Sea and, to a 
lesser extent the East China Sea, due to the proliferation of offshore oil 
and gas activity in waters claimed by numerous littoral states in crowded, 
environmentally sensitive and strategically important waters.
 The analysis is conducted from regional, national and industry gov-
ernance and risk management perspectives. The aim is to identify the 
major risks, assess the likelihood and consequences of the risks arising, 
explore policy and cooperative governance options for mitigating risks 
and consider the strategic implications for regional safety and security. 
The analysis draws upon experience with offshore oil and gas safety and 
security risk management and governance in other parts of the world. 
This includes reviewing selected major incident lessons and regional 
policy responses and arrangements.
 Some may question the appropriateness of adopting a risk manage-
ment driven approach to offshore oil and gas safety and security govern-
ance rather than more traditional approaches. The following quote from 
the Deepwater Horizon Report to the President of the United States,5 
when referring to the largest offshore oil and gas generated environmen-
tal disaster in United States history, points to the answer:
Government agencies that regulate offshore activity should reorient 
their regulatory approaches to integrate more sophisticated risk assess-
ment and risk management practices into their oversight of energy 
developers operating offshore.6
Global Energy Forecasts
Global pressures to find and exploit new energy sources will continue 
to mount into the foreseeable future due to vast increases in the 
5 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, Report to the President, Deep Water The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future 
of Offshore Drilling, January 2011.
6 Ibid., p. 251.
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demand for energy, primarily from developing countries. According 
to the International Energy Agency (IEA) conservative New Policies 
Scenario, with projections that include the likely impact of policies 
intended to mitigate climate change, world energy demand is fore-
cast to increase by one-third between 2010 and 2035.7 Similarly, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy 
Outlook 2011 Reference case, which does not incorporate prospective 
legislation or policies that might affect energy markets, projects that 
world marketed energy consumption will grow by 53 per cent from 
2008 to 2035.8 While both IEA and EIA analyses recognise there are 
uncertainties in their projections, due to global economic growth 
variations and possible environmental policy changes, the deviations 
are unlikely to be significant.
 Notably, 90 per cent of the projected growth in global energy demand 
will come from outside OECD countries9 with China accounting for 
more than 30 per cent. China will be the world’s largest energy consumer, 
increasing to more than 70 per cent higher than the United States, by 
2035. Energy consumption rates in developing Asia Pacific economies, 
including India and Indonesia, are forecast to grow even faster than 
China. Fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) will continue to meet more than 75 
per cent of global demand.10
 According to the IEA, global natural gas demand is forecast to grow 
at 1.7 per cent per annum, almost twice the rate of oil and coal, with the 
major demand coming from China and other non-OECD countries.11 The 
EIA assesses that world natural gas consumption would likely increase by 
52 per cent between 2008 and 2035 and notes that natural gas continues 
to be the fuel of choice in many regions because its relatively low carbon 
intensity makes it an attractive option for nations interested in reducing 
7 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2011 Factsheet, 
viewed 9 August 2012, <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/
factsheets/factsheets.pdf>.
8 EIA, op. cit., p. 19.
9 There are 34 OECD member countries from North and South America to Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific region see OECD Members and Partners, viewed 9 August 
2012, <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/> .
10 IEA, loc. cit.
11 Ibid.
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greenhouse gas emissions, it has relatively low capital costs and is fuel 
efficient.12
 The EIA predicts that increased natural gas usage in non-OECD Asia 
will be led by India and China. China’s central government promotes 
natural gas as a preferred energy source. Natural gas usage in India is 
forecast to grow by 4.6 per cent per annum, with supply constraints 
continuing to hold down consumption.13 The largest increases in import 
demand are projected for China and India, which together will require 
imports of 6.0 trillion cubic feet per annum in 2035. By 2035, China will 
import 40 per cent of its natural gas consumption and India 28 per cent. 
China is actively pursuing multiple potential sources for natural gas 
imports. At the end of 2010, China had four liquid natural gas (LNG) 
import terminals in operation, four under construction, and several more 
proposed or in various stages of development.14
 On the supply side, natural gas production in Australia is predicted 
to grow at an average of 4.5 per cent per annum, the strongest growth 
among OECD countries.15 While emerging economies will increasingly 
dictate energy demand they are also projected to dominate the expan-
sion of natural gas supply with non-OECD countries accounting for 70 
per cent of gas production by 2035. Concomitantly, the world will rely 
increasingly on OPEC16 oil production that will reach more than half the 
world total by 2035.17
 The projected growth in future energy requirements will demand 
12 EIA, op. cit., p. 2.
13 EIA, op. cit., pp. 48–49.
14 EIA, op. cit., p. 62. China is importing natural gas under long-term contracts 
from four countries, with no single country to provide more than 37 percent of 
the total contracted volume. Chinese companies have signed contracts to increase 
imports from Australia, Qatar and Malaysia.
15 EIA, op. cit., p. 52.
16 There are 12 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
member countries: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Qatar, Indonesia, 
Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria and Angola. See OPEC Member 
Countries, viewed 9 August 2012, <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_
us/25.htm>.
17 IEA, loc. cit.
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massive investments in energy-supply infrastructure, estimated at US$38 
trillion from 2011 to 2035, with almost US$20 trillion required for oil and 
gas.18 An important point to note is that climate change policies are not 
predicted to have a significant impact on the demand for and investment 
in global energy because so much is predicated upon the needs of rapidly 
expanding, developing economies. Investment in Asia Pacific offshore 
oil and gas activity will demand a relatively small proportion of the total 
investment in energy compared with offshore Brazil or West Africa and 
onshore investment elsewhere in the World. However, the scale of invest-
ment in Asia Pacific offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation is 
significant, expanding and will present major and increasing strategic, 
economic and environmental challenges.
Implications for Asia Pacific Offshore Oil and Gas
The search for offshore oil and gas in the Asia Pacific region is rapidly 
expanding and intensifying commensurate with the increasing global 
and regional demand for energy and as production from mature fields’ 
declines.19 According to Infield Systems Ltd,20 total capital expenditure 
commitments on offshore oil and gas development in the region are 
expected to exceed US$90 billion during 2011–2015, a 55 per cent 
increase from the previous five-year period.21 Projected offshore field 
developments for the period 2012–2015, which are based upon industry-
sourced contracted commitments, indicate the vast scale of this activity. 
18 IEA, loc. cit.
19 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008, 39, viewed 15 January 
2011, <http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org> , pp. 42–43.
20 Infield Systems Ltd. Infield “is an independent energy research and analysis 
firm that is dedicated to the provision of accurate and up-to-date information, 
databases, research, market forecasts, mapping, commercial market due-
diligence, transaction support, business strategy, analysis and intelligence to the 
global offshore oil, gas, renewable energy and associated marine industries.” A 
wealth of detailed energy industry data and analyses are available, mostly for 
significant fees. See <http://infield.com/>.
21 Gene Kliewer, “Asia/Pacific economic growth drives exploration/production 
offshore”, Offshore, Volume 72, Issue 5, 5 February 2012, viewed 8 August 2012, 
<http://www.offshore-mag.com/>.
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In South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia and Australasia there are 441 
projected shallow (less than 300 metres) and deep water (greater than 
300 metres) oil and gas fields22 involving thousands of exploratory drill-
ings. 387 new sub-sea wells are contracted with a combined total of 70 
floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs), floating 
production systems (FSPs) and floating storage and offloading units 
(FSOs)23 plus over 14,000 kilometres of rigid and flexible flow lines.24 By 
far the greater proportion of the activity, 237 fields,25 is occurring in the 
South China Sea.
Major Offshore Oil and Gas Fields
Major areas of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
covered by this analysis include several new areas offering potential 
oil and gas production. They range from the Mumbai High Basin off 
India’s west coast, and the Bay of Bengal;26 the northwest shelf and 
Timor Basin areas off north-western Australia; the South China Sea 
where variously Malaysia, Brunei, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines are active in the Spratly and Paracel Island areas; Indo-
nesian offshore developments that are progressing in the Makassar 
22 Ibid. Based upon Infield data, the 441 break down is: 397 shallow fields and 44 
deep water fields; 75/10 Australasia, 68/6 East Asia, 34/11 South Asia and 220/17 
South East Asia.
23 Ibid. The breakdown of the 70 floating facilities is: 31 FPSO, 18 FPS and 21 FSO; 
with the majority (49) in the South East Asia area.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 MBendi Information Services, Oil and Gas in India – Overview, viewed 3 
September 2012 <http://www.mbendi.com/indy/oilg/as/in/p0005.htm>. The 
bulk of India’s natural gas production comes from the western offshore regions, 
especially the Mumbai High field. There have been several large natural gas finds 
in India over the last five years, predominantly offshore in the Bay of Bengal.
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Strait;27 the Gulf of Thailand;28 and the East China Sea that includes 
disputed areas, for example around Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai 
Islands;29 and Sakhalin Island off Russia.30
 The competition for access to new and expanding offshore oil and 
gas fields is expected to intensify over the next two decades. How well 
the nations and companies involved are able to manage increasing safety 
and security risks will be critical to regional stability and will impact 
economic and energy security, and potentially environmental, human 
and food security.
Monograph Outline
Chapter 2 looks briefly at offshore oil and gas safety and security inci-
dents around the world and considers lessons and implications for the 
Asian region. The Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the West Atlas incident off northwest Australia are reviewed as case stud-
ies. They are informative, well documented, recent events involving the 
latest technologies and processes. Reports from thorough investigations 
by competent authorities offer policy, governance and risk management 
perspectives that have wider relevance.
 Chapter 3 looks at international and industry risk management fac-
tors and approaches that warrant wider consideration. The Australian 
approach to offshore oil and gas industry security is briefly explored as 
a risk management and governance case study plus regional cooperative 
approaches to environmental security in enclosed and semi-enclosed 
seas.
 Chapters 4 and 5 focus on Asia Pacific regional safety and security 
27 Energy Files, Indonesia, viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.energyfiles.com/
asiapac/indonesia.html>. There are new deep water fields in the Makassar Strait 
off Kalimantan plus gas from the Natuna Sea.
28 Energy Files, Thailand, viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.energyfiles.
com/asiapac/thailand.html>. The bulk of Thailand’s oil production comes from 
offshore in the Gulf of Thailand, much of it associated with gas.
29 Claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan; with the three names those adopted by 
each claimant.
30 Energy Files, Russia, viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.energyfiles.com/
eurfsu/russia.html>.
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challenges, governance practices and options in an endeavour to define 
key strategic risks, identifying what is currently being done to address 
them, and explores options for improving risk management. Chapter 6 
summarises the risks to offshore oil and gas safety and security and out-
lines recommended risk mitigation options. A realistic assessment of the 
consequences of current and most likely courses of action are considered 
in addressing the question: is a disaster inevitable?
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Chapter 2
iNtErNatiONaL OFFsHOrE OiL 
aND Gas saFEty aND sEcurity 
iNciDENts
There have been surprisingly few major safety and security inci-dents given the geographical extent, scale and expanding pro-liferation of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
activities and facilities around the world’s oceans over the past 50 years. 
However, numerous well publicised major safety and security incidents 
have produced significant consequences including loss of human life 
and environmental disasters. Incidents have also resulted in significant 
economic impacts with national, regional and global consequences, at 
least in the short-term.
 A chronological list of significant incidents around the world is 
presented in Annex A. The list is not comprehensive but indicates the 
extent and impact of the problem. The safety and security implications 
of a global industry that operates in a high risk environment are evident. 
Some broad observations can be drawn: only eight of the 48 incidents 
listed occurred in the Asia Pacific region; this can be expected to increase 
with the rapid expansion of activity combined with other factors to be 
analysed later in this report. Twelve incidents were attributed directly 
to extreme weather events (cyclones, typhoons and storms) with 35 
incidents the result of technical failures or operator errors. Only the 
2005–2008 incidents off Nigeria, noting there are many incidents under 
this grouping that have continued since 2008, were directly attributed 
to security attacks. Not shown on this list were numerous offshore oil 
and gas industry incidents arising from war and armed conflict. Many 
offshore rigs, for example, were damaged and massive oil spills at sea 
resulted during the 1990–1991 Persian (Arabian) Gulf War. Reviewing 
offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents globally is helpful to 
defining the general safety and security risk context and for informing 
judgments on the risks of future incidents in the Asia Pacific region.
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Recent Incidents – Relevant Lessons
Incidents that occurred in the West Atlas, Montara field off the northwest 
coast of Australia in 2009 and Deepwater Horizon, Macondo in the Gulf 
of Mexico in 2010 have been chosen for analysis because they are recent, 
the subsequent investigations were well documented and they were both 
subject to high profile, international media attention. Both incidents 
involved rig blowouts attributed to technical, operational and regulatory 
failures. Significant systemic deficiencies were exposed offering lessons 
for the offshore oil and gas sector worldwide.
 Blowouts offshore can have major and long lasting effects. These can 
include loss of human life, pollution of marine and shoreline ecosystems, 
substantial commercial losses and reputational damage for companies 
directly involved, financial losses for third parties affected by the spill, 
impacts on the global economy (through oil and gas price fluctuations), 
and reputational damage to the nations involved, and their regulators. 
Such incidents are relatively rare, although the likelihood must reason-
ably be expected to be on the rise with the search for new oil and gas 
discoveries offshore in ever deeper and more remote waters that test the 
limits of technological capacity, experience and resources of the industry. 
According to the Commissioner’s Report on the West Atlas, Montara 
incident:
Although the likelihood of a major blowout occurring is relatively low, 
the consequences can be very grave. However, the likelihood is relatively 
low only because well integrity is (or should be) scrupulously observed 
by the industry and those who regulate it. At each stage, from explora-
tory drilling through to production, the systems and technologies in 
place are designed to be fail-safe, with considerable back-up capability 
built in to prevent blowouts. The systems and technologies are not new; 
they are well proven and they do work, if correctly applied.1
 Many incidents, if allowed to progress to major proportions, reflect 
failures of both the operators and the regulators, although external fac-
tors like weather and security incidents can also play a significant part. A 
1 David Borthwick, Commissioner, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, 
17 June 2010, p. 5.
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brief analysis of the Deepwater Horizon and West Atlas accidents, from 
strategic risk and governance perspectives, reveals numerous factors of 
relevance to the Asia Pacific.
Deepwater Horizon, Macondo
The Deepwater Horizon offshore rig blowout produced the largest acci-
dental marine oil spill in United States history, inducing a severe human 
and environmental tragedy. The conclusions drawn by the National Com-
mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, in 
their Report to the President of the United States,2 present sobering and 
compelling reading for all involved in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
The Report is written in a graphic, narrative style that paints a vivid 
picture of the incident, its aftermath and the causal factors involved; 
and importantly, presents recommended remedies for improved preven-
tion, response and recovery. The risk management issues identified in 
the Report’s overarching findings could be universally applied. They are 
summarised here:3
•	 The explosive loss of the well could have been prevented.
•	 The immediate causes of the well blowout can be traced to a series 
of identifiable mistakes made by the primary companies involved 
that reveal systematic failures in risk management. They place in 
doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.
•	 Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at 
the frontiers of experience and technology, entails risks for which 
neither industry or government has been adequately prepared.
•	 Fundamental reform will be needed in regulatory oversight and in 
internal decision-making processes to ensure political autonomy, 
technical expertise, and full consideration of environmental pro-
tection concerns.
•	 Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure 
2 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling, Report to the President, Deep Water The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future 
of Offshore Drilling, January 2011.
3 Ibid., p. vii.
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adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take unilat-
eral steps to dramatically increase safety, including self-policing 
mechanisms to supplement government enforcement.
•	 The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, 
responding to, and cleaning up spills lag behind the real risks asso-
ciated with deepwater drilling into large, high-pressure reservoirs 
located far offshore and at great depths. Governments must close 
the gap and industry must support rather than resist that effort.
•	 Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive 
environments, along coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for 
more drilling is inadequate. The same is true of the impacts on 
humans and nature of oil spills.
 The Deepwater Horizon was drilling the Macondo well in 5,000 feet 
(more than 1,500 metres) of water and over 13,000 feet (4,000 metres) 
into the sea floor to the hydrocarbon reservoir below.4 The scale of the 
operation and the levels of complexity, employing the latest technologi-
cal advances in offshore drilling, were immense. Those conducting the 
operation were highly capable and experienced. However, that experi-
ence ironically induced a level of complacency and unwillingness to 
recognise and treat emerging hazards that increased the risks. It had 
become an inherently high risk, high reward venture. The scale of the 
environmental disaster and the response required was also massive, with 
an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, 
requiring responses directed from the highest levels of the United States 
Government.5
 Deepwater Horizon was operating entirely within United States 
waters. Regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas activity was the 
responsibility of the (Federal) Minerals Management Service (MMS). 
The Report to the President notes that U.S. regulatory requirements had, 
4 Ibid., p. viii.
5 Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by President Obama Marking the 
One-Year Anniversary of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill”, The White House, 
20 April 2011, viewed 20 August 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/04/20/statement-president-obama-marking-one-year-anniversary-
bp-deepwater-hori>.
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over time, become inconsistently applied, mainly on the “outer continen-
tal shelf” and particularly the Gulf of Mexico,6 primarily for expedient 
financial and political reasons:
In some offshore regions, oil drilling was essentially banned in response 
to environmental concerns. Elsewhere, most notably in the Gulf, some 
environmental protections and safety oversight were formally relaxed 
or informally diminished so as to render them ineffective, promoting 
a dramatic expansion of offshore oil and gas production and billions 
of dollars in federal revenues.7
 The Report notes that the U.S. Government had the necessary 
authority required to control how oil and gas resources located on the 
outer continental shelf was leased, explored, or developed. The real 
problem was political leaders, both within the Executive Branch and 
Congress, failed to ensure that the regulator (MMS) had the resources 
necessary to exercise that authority. The political autonomy and will 
needed to overcome powerful commercial interests that opposed more 
stringent safety regulation was lacking.8 Although regulatory require-
ments were in place that included promises of layers of environmental 
scrutiny, U.S. Federal oversight of oil and gas activities in the Gulf of 
Mexico took a generally minimalist approach. The Government failed to 
exercise the full scope of its power to ensure the safety of drilling opera-
tions. Many aspects of national environmental law were ignored and 
MMS lacked the resources and technical expertise to demand rigorous 
safety standards be imposed. In increasingly risky deepwater operations, 
the U.S. had fallen behind other countries in its ability to move beyond a 
prescription and inspection system to one based on more sophisticated 
risk analyses. The safety risks had dramatically increased; however, U.S. 
leadership had become preoccupied with the enormous revenues gener-
ated from offshore oil and gas activity with little focus on safety.9
 Even though the U.S. jurisdictional context presented the opportunity 
for tight regulatory control, essential under the prevailing environmental, 
6 National Commission Report, op. cit., pp. 58–67.
7 Ibid., p. 56.
8 Ibid., p. 67.
9 Ibid., pp. 84–85.
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safety and technological circumstances in the Gulf of Mexico, the stage 
was long set for a major, systemic, organisationally induced disaster. The 
cumulative risks of a major accident had grown. Critically, the Report 
notes:
With the benefit of hindsight, the only question had become not 
whether an accident would happen, but when.10
 The Deepwater Horizon oil spill, in the environmentally sensitive 
and attractive tourism area of the Gulf of Mexico, had major collateral 
impacts. Tourism and fishing “were highly sensitive to both direct ecosys-
tem harm and, indirectly, public perceptions and fears of tainted seafood 
and soiled beaches”.11 Profoundly apparent here are the parallel prospects 
of similar accidents in the crowded and environmentally sensitive South 
China Sea where seafood and tourism are vital contributors to food and 
economic security. The extent of the economic impact of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster was evident when BP agreed “to place in escrow a US$20 
billion fund to help address financial losses”.12
 There are other parallels between the Gulf of Mexico situation and 
parts of the Asia Pacific region. In addition to the United States, both 
Mexico and Cuba lay claim to parts of the Gulf of Mexico and have 
expressed interests in deepwater drilling. Deepwater Horizon–type spills 
are likely to put at risk fisheries, coastal tourism and valuable natural 
resources in adjacent national jurisdictions. The Report to the President 
of the United States recognised that it is in the U.S. national interest to 
negotiate with neighbouring countries to produce common standards 
and regulatory systems for the oversight of safety, along with protocols to 
cooperate on containment and response strategies and preparedness, in 
the event of a spill.13 The extent to which this advice needs to be heeded 
in the internationally crowded offshore oil and gas jurisdictions in the 
Asia Pacific region lies at the core of this analysis.
 Pressures to provide energy security in the United States, as else-
10 Ibid., p. 85.
11 Ibid., p. 185.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 300.
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where in the world, are intense and relentless. Energy security could be 
characterised as a euphemism for oil and gas exploitation to continue 
regardless of the risks. The United States Government has demanded 
expeditious responses to the Deepwater Horizon incident primarily to 
enable oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Gulf of Mexico to 
resume. By mid-2012, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior announced that 
U.S. oil production had increased by 13 per cent during the first three 
years of the Obama administration. He stated: “Two years ... from the 
spill, the Gulf of Mexico is back in business ... The total number of active 
offshore rigs in the United States was higher at the end of April 2012 than 
the average total in 2009.”14
 Governments around the world involved in offshore oil and gas 
sector governance, regulation, risk management and incident response 
need to carefully analyse the Deepwater Horizon incident and the U.S. 
response. Whether or not the lessons have been learned and effectively 
applied remains to be seen.
West Atlas, Montara
On 21 August 2009 the Montara Wellhead Platform (WHP) blew out 
“with such force that a column of oil, fluid and gas was expelled from the 
top of the well, through the hatch on the top deck of the WHP, hitting 
the underside of the West Atlas drilling rig and cascading into the sea”.15 
So began Australia’s third largest oil spill and the worst of its kind in the 
history of Australia’s offshore petroleum industry. Fortunately, all 69 
personnel on the rig were safely evacuated.16 For a period of more than 
10 weeks oil flowed unabated into the Timor Sea, at an estimated rate of 
between 400 and 1500 barrels per day, plus unknown amounts 
of gas, condensate and water17 to a total volume of around 29,600 
14 Secretary Ken Salazar, “Responsibly expanding America’s offshore energy 
development”, The White House Blog, 18 July 2012, viewed 20 August 2012, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/18/responsibly-expanding-america-s-
offshore-energy-development>.
15 David Borthwick, loc. cit.
16 Ibid., p. 52.
17 Ibid., pp. 26 and 38.
RSIS Monograph No. 26
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia Pacific: The Need for Regional 
Approaches to Managing Risks
20
barrels of oil.18 The incident occurred 250 kilometres (135 nautical 
miles) off the northwest coast of Australia. Patches of sheen or weathered 
oil could have affected, at various times, an area as large as 90,000 square 
kilometres (50,000 square nautical miles).19
 Unlike Deepwater Horizon Macondo, the Montara oil field is in shal-
low water (defined in the industry as less than 300 metres). The field is 
located in the western section of the Bonaparte Basin in water depths 
ranging between 76 and 90 metres (250 to 300 feet).20 Between January 
and April 2009, the West Atlas rig was positioned over the Montara WHP 
in approximately 77 metres of water with the well drilled to a measured 
depth of 3,796 metres (12,500 feet).21
 In a similar vein to the Deepwater Horizon Commission of Inquiry, 
the West Atlas Commissioner concluded that:
What happened ... was an accident waiting to happen; the company’s 
systems and processes were so deficient and its key personnel so 
lacking in basic competence, that the Blowout can properly be said 
to have been an event waiting to occur22 ...The Blowout serves as an 
important reminder of the very real risks that come with the substan-
tial economic benefits of petroleum developments, and the need for 
an effective regulatory and emergency response framework to ensure 
that sustainable development objectives can be achieved, whilst also 
ensuring well integrity and maintaining high standards of ... safety ... 
and environment protection.23
 Other major findings from the West Atlas Inquiry, noting that 
many are consistent with findings from the Deepwater Horizon Inquiry, 
included:
•	 The primary operator did not observe sensible oilfield practices. 
Major shortcomings in the company’s procedures were wide-
spread and systemic, directly leading to the blowout.
18 Ibid., p. 301.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 36.
21 Ibid., p. 49–50.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
23 Ibid., p. 33.
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•	 The primary regulator was “not a sufficiently diligent regulator”; 
did not recognise that the proposed operations did not reflect 
sensible oilfield practice and “adopted a minimalist approach to 
its regulatory responsibilities”.24 The relationship between the 
company and the regulator “had become far too comfortable”.25
•	 Senior company personnel had limited experience and did not 
fully comprehend the implications of such operations. The com-
pany’s personnel on the rig demonstrated a manifestly inadequate 
understanding and knowledge of what was required. Senior 
company personnel on the rig and onshore were deficient in their 
decision-making and judgments.
•	 There were systemic failures of communication and responsibility 
for safety.
•	 Risks were not recognised when they should have been, and not 
assessed properly when recognised.26
•	 The biggest environmental risk for offshore developments is the 
possibility of large blowouts due to a failure of well integrity.27
•	 The overall response objective of preventing oil from impacting 
on sensitive marine resources (in particular the marine parks 
of Ashmore Reef and Cartier Island, and the northwest coast of 
Western Australia) was largely achieved.28
•	 Scientific monitoring of the environmental effects of the spill was 
late and inadequate.29
 The West Atlas Commissioner commented extensively on regulatory 
philosophy noting that “the Cullen Report (Piper Alpha) recommended 
that the regulation of the offshore petroleum industry move from a pre-
scriptive to an objective-based safety case regime”.30 This philosophy had 
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 19.
28 Ibid., p. 22.
29 Ibid., p. 25.
30 Ibid., pp. 177–178.
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been largely adopted in the Australian case as it had in many jurisdictions 
around the world. A risk management approach is required whereby 
operators accept responsibility and provide a safety case that identifies 
all the hazards and risks, and defines how risks have been reduced to a 
level as low as reasonably practicable. The Commissioner noted that the 
aim is to ensure that those who create risks are responsible for manag-
ing them. Continuous improvements in safety, culture and performance 
need to come from within an operating company, rather than be imposed 
externally by regulators. The move away from prescriptive legislation 
provides companies with flexibility to utilise emerging technologies and 
to manage risk.31 However, with this latitude comes the requirement 
for sophisticated risk management processes, the willingness to accept 
responsibility and to be accountable. The Commissioner noted that, 
while the movement toward a more objective-based regulatory regime 
was appropriate, close regulation is required to ensure that what an 
operator proposes to do “is consistent with good oilfield practice” and 
subject to “targeted monitoring, audit and compliance activities”. The 
regulator must be actively engaged and prepared to engage in a technical 
debate with an operator about what truly is “good oilfield practice”.32
 Similar to the Deepwater Horizon Inquiry, the West Atlas Inquiry 
identified international engagement issues that have resonance with the 
wider Asia Pacific context. The geographic location of the spill and its 
spread raised trans-boundary issues due to small patches of weathered oil 
crossing into Indonesian and Timor-Leste waters. Sheen and weathered 
oil was observed in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), reaching 
to within 94 km of the Indonesian island of Palau Roti. Small amounts of 
weathered oil were also observed in the Joint Petroleum Development 
Area (JPDA), established by the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty between Australia 
and Timor-Leste.33 The need was recognised for Australia to continue to 
act consistently with international law and consistent with developing 
and maintaining strong bilateral relationships.34
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 195.
33 Ibid., p. 302.
34 Ibid.
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Summary Analysis
The West Atlas Commissioner’s Report was submitted before the Deep-
water Horizon Commission of Inquiry had been completed because of the 
close timing proximity of the two incidents. The Australian Government 
observed that “The scale and severity of the 20 April 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon incident ... posed new challenges in respect of coordination, 
international engagement, deepwater technology and the application 
of science, which were not contemplated at the time of the Montara 
Inquiry”.35 Clearly, both events present lessons for wider consideration 
and application, and there is considerable convergence. From these 
two case studies, key factors identified for consideration in develop-
ing regional and national approaches to offshore oil and gas safety and 
security include:
•	 Offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation involve risks 
for which neither industry or government has been adequately 
prepared.
•	 Lax regulation and industrial complacency combined with driv-
ing political and commercial expediency work together to build 
cumulative risks that ultimately create circumstances where sys-
temic, organisationally induced accidents are certain to occur; it 
becomes a matter of when, not if.
•	 Effective risk management requires partnerships between the 
regulator and those being regulated, between government and 
industry, where each partner performs its role diligently and with 
integrity. Governance arrangements and relationships are critical.
•	 While the likelihood of major safety and security incidents may 
be low the consequences can be very high. Consequences can 
include the major loss of human life and environmental disasters. 
Significant economic and reputational damage can also result that 
impact upon commercial, national, regional and global interests.
•	 The rapid expansion of exploration and exploitation activities, 
35 Australian Government, Draft Government Response to the Report of the Montara 
Commission of Inquiry, 24 November 2010, p. 14.
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pushing technology into deeper and more remote waters at the 
frontiers of human experience, mean that there will be more acci-
dents with ever greater consequences in the future.
•	 Safety incidents in the offshore oil and gas industry often result 
from systemic failures in risk management. Imposing effective 
risk management processes supported by sophisticated risk 
analysis and governance arrangements at all levels: international, 
national, industry sector and individual operators, is essential to 
risk reduction.
•	 While objective-based regulatory regimes are generally appropri-
ate and widely employed, an effective and proactive regulatory 
regime must also be in place.
•	 The technology, laws and regulations, practices and capabilities for 
responding to the environmental impacts of spills lag behind the 
real risks associated with large scale and high intensity offshore 
oil and gas exploration and exploitation.
•	 Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensi-
tive marine and coastal environments is generally inadequate as 
is comprehension of the human and natural impacts of oil spills.
•	 Offshore oil and gas incidents will often have significant conse-
quences for neighbouring littoral nations. Major human, environ-
mental and economic security concerns are likely, resulting from 
risks to fisheries, tourism, and marine ecosystems in adjacent 
jurisdictions. International engagement issues including joint 
prevention, response and recovery arrangements and issues 
like boundary delimitation need to be considered, put in place, 
resolved and tested, before major incidents occur.
 These case studies provide a wealth of information that can be drawn 
upon when considering appropriate risk management and governance 
arrangements in the Asia Pacific, particularly in key focal areas like the 
South China Sea. Neither the West Atlas Commissioner nor the Deep-
water Horizon Commissioner made extensive reference to international 
regimes or architectures and the extent to which they offer mechanisms 
for safety and security cooperation between multiple littoral states in 
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areas like the South China Sea. These and related risk management and 
governance factors will be explored in the next chapters.
Annex A –A chronological summary of significant 
offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents
This summary is compiled from several sources:36
•	 30 June 1964. C. P. Baker drilling barge burned and sank in the Gulf 
of Mexico after a shallow gas blowout. Of the 43 crew on board, 
eight were confirmed dead with 13 missing, presumed dead and 
22 injured.
•	 28 December 1965. One of the first drilling rigs in the North Sea, 
the Sea Gem collapsed as a result of metal fatigue, killing 13 of 
the crew.
•	 28 January 1969. A blowout at Platform A near Santa Barbara, 
California led to a spill estimated at up to 100,000 barrels of crude 
oil, fouling the Californian coastline. The spill led to broad oppo-
sition to offshore drilling near California, and helped spur the 
creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
•	 2 January 1974. Transocean III self-elevating semi-submersible sank 
in North Sea. The rig suffered progressive structural damage resulting 
from storm conditions, leading to the evacuation the crew.
•	 15 April 1976. Ocean Express sank during a storm in the Gulf of 
Mexico resulting in 13 fatalities.
•	 June 1977. The Ocean Master II sank off West Africa as a result 
of structural problems and bad weather.
36 Reuters, “Timeline: Major offshore accidents in the global oil industry”, Reuters 
online, 13 May 2010, viewed 15 June 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKTRE64C57O20100513>; Australian Government, Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) (Management of Well Operations) Regulations 2004, 1 December 2004, 
viewed 17 August 2012, <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2004B00402/
Explanatory%20Statement/Text>; and Rigs World, “Offshore Drilling Accidents”, 
viewed 17 August 2012, <http://www.rigsworld.com/Offshore-Accidents.htm>. 
A modified version of the information provided at the references, amplified by 
information from a range of sources, is presented here.
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•	 3 June 1979. The Ixtoc I offshore well in Campeche Bay, Mexico 
suffered a blow out, eventually discharging up to three million 
barrels of crude oil in one of the worst offshore spills in North 
American history. Though various efforts were undertaken to 
lessen the amount of leakage, the spill was not contained until 
March of 1980.
•	 25 November 1979. The Bohai 2 rig capsized and sank in a storm 
while on tow off the coast of China killing 72 crew.
•	 17 January 1980. Whilst working off Nigeria the Sea Quest suffered 
extensive fire damage after a blowout and was then deliberately 
sunk.
•	 27 March 1980. The Alexander Kielland, a floating platform for 
off-duty workers, capsized in the North Sea, killing 123 people.
•	 27 August 1981. The Petormar V drillship sank after a shallow gas 
blowout in the South China Sea.
•	 15 February 1982. The Ocean Ranger semi-submersible drilling rig 
sank off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, while operating the 
Hibernia oil field. The accident occurred during a sudden Atlantic 
cyclone. Rescue efforts were disastrous; the unit sank and all 84 
crewmembers were killed.
•	 1 September 1983. The Key Biscayne capsized and sank off Aus-
tralia’s west coast after flooding and towline failure.
•	 25 October 1983. The U.S. drillship Glomar Java Sea capsized and 
sank due to Typhoon Lex in the South China Sea 63 nautical miles 
southwest of Hainan Island, China and 80 nautical miles east of 
Vietnam killing all 81 persons onboard.
•	 16 August 1984. A blowout on the Enchova platform, operated 
by Brazilian state oil company Petrobras in the Campos Basin, 
caused an explosion and a fire that led to the death of 44 workers.
•	 January 1985. Two men were killed and two injured in a pump 
room explosion on Glomar Arctic II rig in the North Sea.
•	 6 October 1985. West Vanguard suffered an explosion and fire off 
Norway with one fatality.
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•	 24 April 1988. Petrobras Enchova again suffered a gas blowout 
while being converted from oil to gas. The resulting fire burned 
for 31 days. The platform was abandoned without casualty.
•	 6 July 1988. Occidental Petroleum’s Piper Alpha oil production 
platform exploded in the North Sea, after a series of malfunction-
ing parts and a small gas leak ignited under pressure. Eventually, 
the pipeline connecting Piper to the Claymore platform burst and 
Piper slipped into the sea. Of the 224 crewmembers, 165 were 
killed and two rescue vessel crewmen also perished. At the time of 
the accident, Piper Alpha was contributing approximately 10 per 
cent of the North Sea’s oil and gas production. Resulting financial 
losses were estimated at US$3.4 billion.
•	 22 September 1988. A North Sea rig blowout on the Ocean Odys-
sey resulted in the death of the radio operator.
•	 September 1988. Four workers were killed when an oil rig owned 
by Total Petroleum of France exploded and sank off the south-
eastern coast of Borneo.
•	 15 December 1988. The Rowan Gorilla I was crossing the North 
Atlantic when it capsized and sank after structural failure caused 
by bad weather.
•	 28 April 1989. Santa Fe’s Al Baz jack-up rig burned and sank after 
a blowout with the loss of five lives.
•	 May 1989. Three people were injured in an explosion and fire on 
an offshore oil platform owned by Union Oil of California. The 
rig was operating southwest of Anchorage, Alaska.
•	 8 November 1989. After a dramatic crew rescue, the Interocean II 
sank in a North Sea storm, due to towline failure.
•	 3 November 1989. The drilling ship Seacrest capsized and floated 
for several days on the surface before sinking during Typhoon Gay 
in the Gulf of Thailand. 91 of the 97 crewmembers were killed.
•	 23 August 1991. A design error resulted in the structural failure 
of the Sleipner A platform.
•	 29 September 1992. Blake IV and Greenhill Petroleum Well 250 
RSIS Monograph No. 26
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia Pacific: The Need for Regional 
Approaches to Managing Risks
28
blew out in the Gulf of Mexico. The well ignited after two days 
and took 11 days to cap.
•	 January 1995. 13 people were killed and many injured in an explo-
sion on a Mobil oil rig off the coast of Nigeria.
•	 January 1996. Three people were killed and two injured in an 
explosion on a rig in the Morgan oil field in the Gulf of Suez.
•	 16 Nov 1996. A punch-through caused extensive damage to the 
Maersk Victory while working in Australian waters in St. Vincent’s 
Gulf, South Australia.
•	 June 1998. Mr Bice, a jackup drilling rig, sank in the Gulf of Mexico 
after structural failure and flooding.
•	 July 1998. Two men died in an explosion on the Glomar Arctic IV rig.
•	 15 April 2000. Al Mariyah Rig/NDC Al Mariyah jack-up rig col-
lapsed and lost its derrick in the Umm Shaif Field, United Arab 
Emirates with four fatalities.
•	 January 2001. Two workers died from a fire on a Petrobras offshore 
natural gas platform in Campos Basin.
•	 20 March 2001. Explosions on P-36 offshore production plat-
form, operated by Brazilian state oil company Petrobras, killed 
11 people. It sank off the coast of Rio de Janeiro five days later, 
spilling some of the 10,000 barrels of fuel and crude it was storing 
into the Atlantic.
•	 30 September 2002. A leg punch-through led to a blowout and 
fire which sank both the Arabdrill 19 and a production platform 
in Saudi’s Khafji Field, with three fatalities.
•	 10 August 2004. The Adriatic IV was on location over the Temsah 
gas production platform, off Port Egypt in the Mediterranean. The 
rig was drilling a natural gas well when a gas blowout occurred. 
More than 150 workers were evacuated with no casualties. The 
Adriatic IV as sunk and not salvageable.
•	 27 July 2005. A multi-purpose support vessel crashed into the 
Indian government owned Mumbai High North platform off 
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India’s west coast. An explosion and massive fire resulted. The 
platform was evacuated and completely destroyed within two 
hours. 22 of the 384 workers onboard were killed. 123,000 bar-
rels of crude production, 15 per cent of India’s domestic output, 
was affected.
•	 2005–2008. A large number of incidents of armed attacks have 
been documented on offshore oil facilities off the coast of Nige-
ria, perpetrated by local militant groups. These have resulted in 
deaths, injuries and abductions, rig or vessel explosions and oil 
pollution. They had national and global economic consequences.37
•	 2007. During stormy weather, the Usumacinta rig collided with 
the Kab-101 platform off the coast of Mexico, causing fuel leaks 
and killing 21 workers in one of state oil company Pemex’s worst 
accidents.
•	 21 August 2009. The West Atlas mobile drilling rig leaked oil and 
gas into the Timor Sea from the Montara oil field off the northwest 
coast of Australia, and later sank after a fire. The spill continued 
for months before relief wells were drilled to plug the leak, deposit-
ing millions of gallons of crude into a sensitive marine ecosystem. 
All 69 workers were evacuated. The resulting oil slick spread over 
approximately 50,000 square miles, killing marine life in affected 
areas. The leak was not plugged until 1 November 2009.
•	 20 April 2010. BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded off the 
coast of Louisiana, United States and burned for 36 hours before 
sinking. 11 crewmembers died and more were seriously injured. 
Environmental damage to the surrounding Gulf shore was exten-
sive. It was one of the worst environmental disasters of all time.
•	 13 May 2010. The exploration rig, Aban Pearl, a Venezuelan 
natural gas exploration rig sank in the Gulf of Paria, near Trinidad 
and Tobago in the Caribbean Sea. All 95 workers on the rig were 
rescued and there was no gas leak.
37 Mikhail Kashubsky, “Offshore energy force majeure: Nigeria’s local problem with 
global consequences”, Maritime Studies, Vol. 160, May/June 2008, pp. 20–25.
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•	 2 September 2010. Mariner Energy’s Vermillion Oil Rig 380 
exploded off the coast of Louisiana, 200 miles east of where the 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy occurred. All 13 crewmembers were 
rescued by a supply ship. None were seriously injured.
•	 November 2011. A deepwater well in the Chevron-operated Frade 
field offshore Brazil leaked 2,400 barrels of oil from the seabed. 
The leak was halted within four days and the oil did not reach the 
shoreline.
•	 17 December 2011. An oil rig capsized and sank as it was being 
towed in a storm in the Sea of Okhotsk 200 kilometers off Russia’s 
remote eastern island of Sakhalin. More than 50 Russian crew 
members were reported to be dead or missing.
•	 16 January 2012. Chevron Nigeria Limited oil rig KS Endeavour 
experienced an explosion six miles off the coast of Nigeria with 
two fatalities. Fire was still burning three days later. Environmental 
damage to sea life was significant.
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Chapter 3
iNtErNatiONaL risK 
maNaGEmENt aPPrOacHEs
As outlined in Chapter 1, the selected methodology for this analy-sis is to consider national and regional strategic risk manage-ment approaches to governance. The case studies in Chapter 2 
demonstrated that managing risks to safety and security in the offshore 
oil and gas sector requires effective partnerships between governments 
and industry. This chapter further explores approaches to managing risks 
to safety and security in the offshore oil and gas sector. An Australian 
security risk case study will be considered along with regional environ-
mental risk approaches employing collaborative and cooperative regimes 
for mitigating risks, based upon international conventions, protocols, 
codes and standards.
 A fundamental aspect of effective partnerships is sound communi-
cation, a challenging prospect in the offshore oil and gas context where 
government and industry partners have diverse perspectives, priorities 
and cultures. Finding a common medium to facilitate effective com-
munication about and approaches to managing risk is an essential 
starting point. The International Standard ISO 31000:2009 Risk manage-
ment – Principles and guidelines,1 and associated documents, provide 
mechanisms for risk management communication and cooperation. The 
Standard presents internationally accepted best practice frameworks and 
guidelines for action on risk management. ISO 31000 is widely used by 
industry around the world, is mandated for use in many jurisdictions and 
by international industry bodies, and is increasingly being adopted for 
use by governments.2
1 ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Principles and guidelines published 13 
November 2009.
2 ISO 31000, with its recommended approaches to risk management, is widely used 
by government departments and agencies in Australia, for example.
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What are the Benefits of Formal Risk Management Approaches?
Risk management is fundamentally about adopting a structured approach 
to dealing with uncertainty. ISO 31000 presents a framework that is 
intended to help “ensure that risk is managed effectively, efficiently and 
coherently…in a systematic, transparent and credible manner”.3 Major 
offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents will have security, eco-
nomic, environmental and human consequences that are likely to be felt 
beyond individual national jurisdictions and company operations.4 This 
scenario is particularly likely in the interconnected littoral geography 
found in parts of the Asia Pacific region. Managing the risks to major off-
shore oil and gas activity has regional, national and industry dimensions.
 The risk management framework presents a systemised way to 
identify, analyse, evaluate and treat risks to support strategies for major 
safety and security incident prevention, response and recovery. Formal 
risk management approaches to offshore oil and gas security are already 
in place in some regional jurisdictions, for example Australia,5 but are 
not yet widely embraced in Asia. A significant benefit of governments 
adopting formal risk management approaches is that they are well under-
stood and widely used by industry; effective communication and shared 
responsibilities for managing risk is, therefore, facilitated.
Effective Risk Management Requirements
The requirements of effective risk management at the regional and 
national level includes, in summary:
•	 Defining the risk context;
•	 Identification of key risks and vulnerabilities that may impact 
safety and security;
•	 Rigorous and ongoing assessments by competent and experienced 
3 ISO 31000, op. cit., p. iv.
4 See Lee Cordner, “Managing regional risk: offshore oil and gas safety and security 
in the Asia-Pacific region”, Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 2011, pp. 15–24.
5 Lee Cordner, “Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Security Risk Assessment: An 
Australian Case Study” in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr 
(Eds.), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 2009, pp. 169–183.
Chapter 3
International Risk Management Approaches
33
individuals and responsible organisations of the likelihood and 
consequences of the risks arising;
•	 The formulation of policy and actions to mitigate risks so that they 
are reduced to as low as reasonably practicable;
•	 The acceptance of residual risk (i.e. risk that is unable to be fully 
mitigated) by responsible authorities, where necessary;
•	 Formulation of risk prevention, response and recovery options, 
arrangements, processes and mechanisms; and
•	 Consideration of regional collaborative arrangements and mecha-
nisms to deal with cross-jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional 
risk management and incident prevention, response and recovery.
 Other risk management elements that require consideration at the 
regional and national levels include enterprise risk management (ERM)6 
and the difficult area of understanding and managing cumulative, accu-
mulated or aggregated risks7 in the offshore oil and gas sector. ERM 
6 The (U.S.) Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) defines enterprise risk management (ERM) as: “a process, effected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy 
setting and across an enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives”. HM Treasury (U.K.) 
defines ERM as: “All the processes involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, 
assigning ownership, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them and monitoring 
and reviewing progress.” Implicit in these ERM definitions is recognition that it 
presents a strategic decision support framework for management designed to 
improve the quality of decision-making at all levels of an organisation or entity.
7 How risks combine and potentially magnify due to cumulative and/or aggregated 
risk factors, which often appear to be discrete and diverse but in fact impact on 
each other, presents challenges to risk management at national and organisational 
levels. Evaluations of aggregated and accumulated risk at larger organisational levels 
that involve complex interactions require access to good data and the application of 
experienced judgment employing a largely qualitative approach. Effective quantitative 
assessment of aggregated and accumulated risk in organisations has generally proven 
elusive. Various approaches, models and technology driven systems have been tried. 
The results have been useful for calculating aggregated risk at a tactical level where 
largely technical, routinised processes are employed. Reasonable confidence in 
qualitative approaches to assessing aggregated and accumulated risk at the enterprise 
or organisational level requires sound organisational constructs, good risk and safety 
management processes, systems and information, and the engagement of suitably 
experienced and responsible management oversight.
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entails managing the regional, national and/or organisational risks that 
can impact upon the viability of an enterprise. ERM requires strategic 
perspectives that comprehend linkages between diverse and inter-related 
aspects of an endeavour, for example: political, economic, security, 
environmental, social, cultural, safety, technological, and international 
relations factors. In the complex world of offshore oil and gas activity 
all of these areas are relevant as they present risks to the attainment or 
protection of national and commercial objectives and interests.
Security Risk Management – Australian Case Study
A comprehensive review of the effectiveness of Australia’s approach to 
offshore oil and gas security was commissioned by the Australian Gov-
ernment in 2011–2012,8 some eight years after imposition of a mandatory 
security-regulated regime. The outcome of that review was released to 
the public on 25 June 20129 and provides timely information to support 
this analysis. The Offshore Oil and Gas Resources Sector Security Inquiry 
Report10 advised that a risk-based, intelligence-led approach to security 
oversight11 underpins Australia’s offshore oil and gas security regime.12
 Although Australia is a relatively small player in the global oil and gas 
equation it has significant offshore oil and gas interests, primarily to the 
8 The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport , 
“Inquiry into the security of the offshore oil and gas sector”, Media Release, 1 
February 2011, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://www.minister.infrastructure.
gov.au/aa/releases/2011/February/aa012_2011.aspx>.
9 The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, 
“Retirement of the Inspector of Transport Security; Tabling of the Offshore 
Oil and Gas Resources Sector Security Inquiry Report”, Ministerial Statement, 
Parliament House, Canberra, 25 June 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://
www.minister.infrastructure.gov.au/aa/speeches/2012/AS24_2012.aspx>.
10 Office of the Inspector of Transport Security, Gas Resources Sector Security 
Inquiry, Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 
June 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/
transport/security/oits/files/Offshore_Oil_and_Gas_Resources_Sector_Security_
Inquiry.pdf>.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
12 Lee Cordner, “Offshore oil and gas”, 2009, loc. cit. A comprehensive analysis of 
the Australian Government’s risk management based approach to offshore oil 
and gas security in Australia’s jurisdiction, including legislation, regulation and 
government-industry engagement, is presented here.
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north of the country, and is expanding exports of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG). Australia’s identification as a terrorist target by Al Qaida, geographic 
location next to Southeast Asia and strong alignment against Islamist sup-
ported terrorism have compelled the Australian Government, along with 
the key industry players involved, to take a proactive and determined stance 
to address terrorist security risks to its offshore oil and gas industry.
 Significant gas reserves are located offshore to the northwest and 
north of Australia in Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
in the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA)13 with East Timor.
FIGURE 1
North Western Australia Offshore Oil and Gas Areas14
13 Australian Government, Australia-East Timor Maritime Arrangements, viewed 
3 September 2012, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east_timor/fs_maritime_
arrangements.html>. A useful summary is provided here of the 2006 Treaty on 
Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS Treaty) and 2003 
International Unitisation Agreement for Greater Sunrise (IUA) that Australian 
and East Timor brought into force on 23 February 2007.
14 Lee Cordner, “Offshore oil and gas”, 2009, op. cit., p. 170.
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Australia’s major customers are Japan, South Korea and China. LNG is 
shipped by tanker, passing through the archipelagic waters of Southeast 
Asia. Domestic energy needs in parts of Australia are also largely met 
by natural gas, with the State of Western Australia heavily reliant upon 
gas piped overland from the North West Shelf. The JPDA offers vastly 
increased potential for natural gas production when fully operational.
Applicability of the ISPS code to offshore oil and gas
The December 2002 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Confer-
ence of Contracting Governments adopted The International Code for 
the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS Code) and International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) amendments to 
Chapter XI-1 and a new Chapter XI-2, to be implemented by 1 July 2004. 
SOLAS 74 was extended to cover port facilities noting that “provisions 
relating to port facilities should relate solely to the ship/port interface”.15
 Of direct relevance to the oil and gas industry was the inclusion of 
cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, mobile offshore drill-
ing units and requirements that Ship Security Plans should contain 
provisions for a ship when interfacing with “fixed or floating platforms 
or a mobile drilling unit on location”.16 IMO Conference Resolution 7 
recognised the need to establish measures to enhance the security of 
mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed and floating plat-
forms not covered by Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74. However, the ISPS 
Code and SOLAS 74 fell short of encompassing such offshore facili-
ties. The IMO encouraged Contracting Governments, when exercising 
their responsibilities for mobile offshore drilling units and for fixed and 
floating platforms operating on their Continental Shelf or within their 
Exclusive Economic Zone, to ensure that security arrangements apply-
ing to offshore facilities would allow interaction with ships covered by 
the Convention. Governments were requested to inform the IMO of any 
15 International Maritime Organization, ISPS Code 2003 Edition: International Ship 
& Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendments 2002, London 9 to 13 
December 2002, Annex 1 pp. 3 and 9.
16 Ibid., Annex 1 pp. 6, 63 and 83.
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actions they have taken in this respect.17
 The IMO, in responding to requests for advice on the application of 
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code to FPSOs and FSUs reiterated 
the view that such facilities were not “ships subject to the provisions of 
the ISPS Code”. However they should have security procedures in place to 
prevent contamination of ships and port facilities subject to the Code.18 
Further, the IMO advised that:
As FPSOs and FSUs operate as part of offshore oil production facilities, 
it can be expected that the State on whose continental shelf or within 
whose Exclusive Economic Zone the activity is being undertaken will 
have developed appropriate security measures and procedures under 
its national law to protect offshore facilities.19
 The onus is clearly placed on nations to provide legislation that 
addresses security arrangements for offshore oil and gas facilities operat-
ing within a national EEZ or on a continental shelf.
The SUA treaties
The United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988)20 and Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol 1988)21 were initially 
developed in response to the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985. The SUA 
Convention (SUA 2005) and Protocol (SUA Protocol 2005) resulted from 
17 Ibid., Annex 2 pp 8–9 Conference Resolution 7.
18 International Maritime Organization, Guidance Relating to the Implementation 
of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, MSC/Circ.1097, London 6 June 2003, 
viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.imo.org/>.
19 International Maritime Organization, Guidance Relating to the Implementation 
of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, MSC/Circ.1111, London 7 June 2004, 
viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.imo.org/> .
20 United Nations, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), Australian Treaty Series 1993 
No. 10, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995.
21 United Nations, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Australian Treaty Series 1993 
No. 11, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995.
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an IMO Conference in London in October 200522 and came into force 
on 28 July 2010.23 The main purpose of the SUA Treaties is to provide 
an international legal basis for ensuring that appropriate action can be 
taken against persons committing unlawful acts.
 The 2005 amendments to the SUA Treaties impose an expanded 
range of provisions specifically targeted at international terrorism. The 
SUA 1988 Protocol (and the SUA protocol 2005 amendments) extends 
the provisions of the SUA Treaties, as they apply to shipping, to offshore 
oil and gas platforms on the continental shelf. Contracting Governments 
are authorised to enact legislation for dealing with unlawful acts of vio-
lence against such platforms. The inconsistency of the IMO’s approach 
with the ISPS Code and SOLAS 74 amendments, in not including off-
shore platforms, is underlined by the SUA Treaties.
 The SUA Treaties provide the international basis for responding to 
acts or threats of terrorism and other criminal acts against ships and 
fixed offshore platforms. They do not provide the basis for prevention 
or recovery. In Australia, the SUA Treaties are enacted in the Crimes 
(Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 199224 which provides the legal basis for 
authorities to respond to such crimes under Australian jurisdiction, and 
to bring offenders to justice.
The Australian response
The Australian response to offshore oil and gas industry security must 
be seen in the context of broader, whole of government approaches to 
dealing with the threat of terrorism. The responsibilities, authorities 
and mechanisms to prevent, and if necessary manage acts of terrorism 
and their consequences are outlined in the National Counter-Terrorism 
22 International Maritime Organization, Final Act of the International Conference 
on the Revision of the SUA Treaties, LEG/CONF.15/23, London 19 October 2005, 
viewed 3 September 2012, <http://www.imo.org/> .
23 IMO, viewed 22 August 2012, <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>.
24 Australian Government, Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992, Act No. 
173 of 1992 as amended, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, May 2001.
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Plan (NCTP).25 Security of the Australian offshore oil and gas industry 
is affected by many aspects of the NCTP and related arrangements, 
summarised as follows:
•	 Australian Government responsibilities include maintenance of 
counter-terrorism capabilities, prevention strategies and opera-
tional responses to threats, leading the management of intelli-
gence, and determining and promulgating the national counter-
terrorism alert level.
•	 The Australian Government regulates security arrangements for 
Australian ports, port facilities, ships and offshore oil and gas 
facilities.
•	 Responsibilities for critical infrastructure (CI) protection are out-
lined. These apply to offshore oil and gas facilities that contribute 
significantly to meeting Australia’s energy needs and/or contribute 
significantly to export income. A National Committee on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (NCCIP) coordinates arrangements with 
a Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) that includes 
Energy industry advice. A Business Government Advisory Group 
on National Security is also in place.26
•	 A Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) has been estab-
lished to facilitate the sharing of security information (including 
intelligence, where necessary) between the Australian Govern-
ment and owners and operators of CI.27
Arrangements specific to the offshore oil and gas industry
The Australian Government responded in a timely and proactive manner 
to implementation of the ISPS Code and SOLAS 74 amendments. In 
25 Australian Government, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, Second Edition, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, September 2005, Plus amendments 
relating to National Counter-Terrorism Alert System introduced on 1 October 
2008, viewed 22 August 2012, <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au> .
26 Australian Government, Protecting Australia Against Terrorism 2006: Australia’s 
National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Arrangements, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra 2006, pp. 16 and 29.
27 National Counter-Terrorism Plan, op. cit., p. 3:6.
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2004, an Australian Government Task Force on Offshore Maritime Secu-
rity concluded that there was a need for security regulations that apply 
to ports and shipping to be extended to the offshore oil and gas indus-
try. The amended Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security 
Act (MTOFSA) 200328 and Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities 
Security Regulations 200329 provided the remedy. The Act and Regula-
tions require that ISPS Code requirements similar to those for ships and 
port facilities apply to offshore oil and gas facilities and offshore service 
providers operating under Australian jurisdiction.
 The MTOFSA and Regulations established the regulatory framework 
for Australian offshore oil and gas security. Compliance by offshore 
industry participants is mandatory, just as Australia, as a Contracting 
Government, is obliged to set in place arrangements to comply with 
the ISPS Code and SOLAS 74 amendments. All offshore industry par-
ticipants30 are required to have Government approved offshore security 
plans in place. Failure to comply satisfactorily is an offence. Approval 
for offshore security plans that are deemed to be inadequate can be 
cancelled. Cancellation of an offshore security plan effectively means 
the industry participant can no longer operate.31
Security risk assessment and management
Risk management fundamentally underpins the offshore oil and gas 
industry security processes in the Australian context. Offshore facility 
operators are required to have a valid security risk assessment as part 
of an offshore security plan that must include: (i) details of the risk 
28 Australian Government, Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 
2003, Act No. 131 of 2003 as amended, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 
2006.
29 Australian Government, Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security 
Regulations 2003, Statutory Rules 2003 No. 366 as amended, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra 27 March 2007.
30 Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003, op. cit., p 16. 
“Offshore industry participant means: an offshore facility operator; a contractor 
who provides services to an offshore facility operator; or a person who: conducts 
an enterprise connected with a security regulated offshore facility; and is 
prescribed by the regulations.”
31 Australian Government MTOFSA Act and Regulations, op. cit.
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management process adopted; (ii) the risk context or threat situation 
for each facility; (iii) identification of possible risks or threats, with the 
likelihood and consequences of their occurrence; and (iv) identification 
of possible risk treatments and their effectiveness in reducing risks and 
vulnerabilities.
 The Australian Government issues and updates Offshore Oil & Gas 
Risk Context Statements (OGRCS)32 and the Offshore Security Assess-
ments Guidance Paper (OSAGP).33 The OGRCS provides a contextual 
and dynamic overview of the transnational terrorism security environ-
ment relevant to the Australian oil and gas industry. The document is 
intended only to supplement threat and risk assessment information 
from other sources. The onus remains upon specific owner/operators to 
determine their own security risks utilising risk assessment processes.
 These documents outline a coordinated approach to security risk 
management from a national level through enterprise and organisational 
levels down to individual operations and operators. Specific risk man-
agement guidance for the oil and gas sector is provided utilising generic 
approaches defined by Australian and New Zealand risk management 
standards and guidelines,34 which are effectively the same as ISO 31000.
Offshore security risk assessments
The OSAGP provides concise guidance on security risk assessment 
processes to assist offshore oil and gas operators to meet the security 
assessment requirements of the MTOFSA and Regulations. Clearly it is 
in the interests of industry participants to follow the processes outlined. 
They are obliged to submit offshore security plans to the Australian 
Government for approval. Notably, the prescribed process is consistent 
32 Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Offshore 
Oil & Gas Risk Context Statement can be obtained by industry participants upon 
request, viewed 22 August 2012, <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/
security/maritime/security_plans/offshore_facility.aspx>.
33 Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Preparing 
Offshore Security Plans, April 2009, viewed 22 August 2012, <http://www.
infrastructure.gov.au/>.
34 Published as Standards Australia AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Risk Management – 
Principles and Guidelines
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with risk management processes practiced across the industry for other 
aspects of operations, including safety.
 The OSAGP recognises that risk analyses can be qualitative, quan-
titative or semi-quantitative. It advises that qualitative risk analyses are 
sufficient for offshore oil and gas security risk assessments as they pro-
vide satisfactory indicators of risk levels. Guidance is provided on risk 
categories, likelihood and consequence estimates, and risk treatments 
and other factors in the risk management process, along with basic tem-
plates that may assist those preparing risk assessments.
Industry response
The Australian Government mandated counter-terrorism security 
arrangements have been welcomed by the principal companies operat-
ing in the Australian offshore oil and gas industry.35 At an earlier stage, 
offshore facility operators were concerned about the potential vulner-
ability of their facilities to terrorist attack. However, they were not in a 
position to fully understand and assess the risks themselves, nor do they 
have the authority or security capabilities to effectively treat the risks. 
Intelligence, surveillance and response capabilities and the authority for 
their employment primarily lies with Australian Government agencies. 
The Gas Resources Sector Security Inquiry Report noted the ongoing 
constructive relationship between industry and government agencies. 
The need to enhance mutual levels of understanding, particularly in the 
security space, and to clarify and improve incident reporting, response 
and command and control was also identified.36
 Both government and industry recognise that they have vital interests 
in a secure oil and gas industry and an effective partnership is required to 
ensure this is provided. Offshore industry participants are very familiar 
with, and in many cases deeply experienced in the application of risk 
management processes. Risk management in the oil and gas sector has 
been driven by the need to comply with stringent occupation health and 
safety requirements, as well as the need to address political, technical and 
35 Lee Cordner, “Offshore oil and gas”, 2009, op. cit.
36 Office of the Inspector of Transport Security, Gas Resources Sector Security 
Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
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financial risks for projects often requiring significant investment outlays 
seeking large returns over extended timeframes.
 Embracing formal risk management approaches in some parts of the 
government sector in Australia lagged behind industry and it has taken 
time for this situation to be redressed. Oil and gas companies initially 
found themselves interfacing with public organisations less proficient 
in risk management processes than themselves.37 There are also diverse 
organisational culture, priority and perception differences that have to 
be managed. In the Australian context, establishing coordinating entities 
that facilitate industry-government security interfaces have improved 
communication and understanding. Similarly, the establishment of an 
intelligence and information network has been an essential development, 
important to counter-terrorism efforts.
 The Australian case study is useful for informed understanding about 
the application of risk management processes at national and enterprise 
levels to the offshore oil and gas industry. While geographical, political, 
cultural, environmental and other factors will vary greatly around the world 
there is a common requirement to effectively manage security risks.
Environmental Protection Risk Management – Regional 
Case Studies
Offshore oil and gas risk management includes the need to protect 
the environment from massive damage. Collaborative and cooperative 
regional regimes for protecting the environment and mitigating risks of 
marine pollution, based upon international conventions and codes in 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, are considered 
noting that both are connected to the northwest Indian Ocean. These 
areas meet UNCLOS38 criteria for “enclosed or semi-enclosed seas”39 
that encourages littoral states to cooperate either “directly or through 
an appropriate regional organisation”40 to co-ordinate such matters as 
37 Lee Cordner, “Offshore oil and gas”, 2009, loc. cit.
38 United Nations (1982), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994.
39 Ibid., Article 122.
40 Ibid., Article 123.
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the management, conservation, protection and preservation of living 
resources and the marine environment.41
South China Sea – A semi-enclosed sea
Notably, the environmentally sensitive and hydrocarbon rich South China 
Sea also falls under the UNCLOS definition of a large semi-enclosed sea. 
The northern and southern extremities are “connected to another sea or 
the ocean (the Pacific and Indian Oceans) by a narrow outlet”.42 There are 
several narrow outlets: the Taiwan Strait, Luzon Strait, Malacca Strait and 
the Sunda Strait plus other, narrower outlets to the Philippine, Celebes 
and Java Seas. The South China Sea is also “surrounded by two or more 
States” and eventually, subject to resolution of delimitation disputes, 
may consist “entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal states”.43
 The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DoC) provides for cooperative activities, consistent 
with those prescribed by UNCLOS Article 123 to occur “pending 
a comprehensive and durable settlement of the (territorial and 
jurisdictional) disputes”.44 Progress so far has been minimal; related 
factors, including the willingness of Asia Pacific states to embrace 
international codes and conventions, will be further addressed in 
Chapter 5. The UNCLOS semi-enclosed sea regime requirements 
41 Ibid.
42 United Nations 1982, op. cit., Article 122.
43 Ibid.
44 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 
November 2002, viewed 4 September 2012, <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.
htm>. Article 6 states “Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the 
disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. 
These may include the following: a. marine environmental protection; b. marine 
scientific research; c. safety of navigation and communication at sea; d. search 
and rescue operation; and e. combating transnational crime, including but not 
limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal 
traffic in arms.”
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in the South China Sea45 lay behind the decision by the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) 46 to convene a 
Study Group that produced a Memorandum on this matter.47 The 
Memorandum provides general guidance and lacks detail because 
regional sensitivities have to be accommodated for even modest 
cooperative progress to be made with Asia Pacific regional dia-
logue, even through non-binding discourse via Track II entities 
like CSCAP.
Marine pollution and environmental protection – Mediterranean 
Sea and Persian Gulf
In addition to UNCLOS as the overarching regime for sea law, there are 
conventions and protocols that specifically address marine pollution and 
have significance for the offshore oil and gas sector. The 1972 London 
Convention,48 1996 Dumping Protocol49 and the International Conven-
tion on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 
45 Lee Cordner, “The Spratly Islands dispute and the Law of the Sea”, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Volume 25, 1994, pp. 61–74. An analysis of 
the South China Sea claimants’ positions relevant to UNCLOS is presented here 
with a brief overview of the merits of the South China Sea being determined as a 
semi-enclosed sea at pp. 70–71.
46 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) provides an 
informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities 
to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. CSCAP 
comprises 21 full members: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, 
Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United 
States of America and Vietnam and one associate member (Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat). Viewed 4 September 2012, <http://www.cscap.org/>.
47 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Guidelines for 
Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas 
of the Asia Pacific, Memorandum 13, June 2008, viewed 4 September 2012, < 
http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=cscap-memoranda>.
48 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other 
Matters 1972 (1972 London Convention), adopted 29 December 1972 (entered 
into force generally 30 August 1975).
49 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 (1996 Dumping Protocol), adopted 7 
November 1996 (entered into force generally 24 March 2006).
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(OPRC 1990)50 are relevant to marine pollution prevention, response 
and recovery. OPRC 1990 presents mandatory requirements for pol-
lution emergency plans for vessels, offshore drilling units, production 
platforms, and onshore facilities. Offshore units include both floating and 
fixed structures engaged in exploration, production, loading and unload-
ing of oil.51 States are encouraged to cooperate and establish regional as 
well as national systems for oil pollution preparedness and response.52
 The 1972 London Convention addresses dumping from offshore 
platforms and other manmade structures, including deliberate disposal 
of offshore platforms. The 1996 Dumping Protocol recently entered into 
force and superseded the 1972 London Convention and is more restrictive 
as it adopts a “precautionary approach”53 and a “reverse list approach”.54
 Agreements have been struck in many regions around the world55 
that specifically impose regional arrangements consistent with those 
50 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation 1990 (OPRC 1990), adopted 30 November 1990 (entered into force 
generally 13 May 1995).
51 Ibid., Article 3.
52 Ibid., Article 6.
53 1996 Dumping Protocol, op. cit., Article 3(1). The precautionary approach 
requires that appropriate preventive measures are taken when there is reason to 
believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment are 
likely to cause harm, even when there is no conclusive evidence establishing a link 
between inputs and their effects.
54 Ibid., Article 4(1). The reverse list approach prohibits all dumping unless it 
is explicitly permitted in the approved list. This effectively limits a range of 
waste materials that may be disposed of at sea and presents a new approach to 
regulating the use of the sea as a depository of wastes.
55 See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), <http://www.unep.ch/
regionalseas/legal/conlist.htm>, viewed 6 September 2012, for a listing of regional 
treaties.
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international treaties. These include the Barcelona Convention56 and 
the Madrid Protocol57 in the Mediterranean Sea that deal with pollution 
resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and 
the seabed and its subsoil,58 requires parties to cooperate in dealing with 
pollution emergencies,59 and to engage in scientific and technological 
co-operation.60 Similarly, the objectives of the Kuwait Convention61 and 
56 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Convention for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 1976 (Barcelona Convention) 
revised in Barcelona, Spain, 10 June 1995 and replaced by the Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, entered into force 9 July 2004, viewed 6 September 2012, <http://
www.unep.ch/regionalseas/regions/med/t_barcel.htm>. The Contracting Parties 
are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, European 
Community, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, 
Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey.
57 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Protocol for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil 1994 (Madrid 
Protocol), adopted 14 October 1994 in Madrid, Spain, has not yet entered 
into force, viewed 6 September 2012, <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/
programmes/unpro/mediterranean/instruments/default.asp>.
58 UNEP, Barcelona Convention, op. cit., Article 7 requires “Contracting Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution of 
the Mediterranean Sea area resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil.”
59 Ibid., Article 9 states “Contracting Parties shall co-operate in taking the necessary 
measures for dealing with pollution emergencies in the Mediterranean Sea area, 
whatever the causes of such emergencies and reducing or eliminating damage 
resulting therefrom.”
60 Ibid., Article 11.
61 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Kuwait Regional Convention 
for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution 
(Kuwait Convention); adopted 24 April 1978, in force 1 July 1979, Contracting 
Parties: State of Bahrain, Iran, Republic of Iraq, State of Kuwait, Sultanate of 
Oman, State of Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
viewed 6 September 2012, <http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/
nonunep/ropme/instruments/default.asp>.
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associated Protocols62 in the Persian Gulf include cooperation in prevent-
ing and dealing with pollution of the marine environment from various 
sources including “exploration and exploitation of the bed of the territo-
rial sea and its subsoil and the continental shelf ... (and) co-operation in 
dealing with pollution Emergencies”.63
 These Agreements include the formulation of regional action plans for 
protecting the coastal and marine environment and for dealing with pol-
lution.64 Such agreements do not yet exist in the northeast Indian Ocean 
and western Pacific Ocean to address the need for cooperative, regional 
approaches in areas like the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Asso-
ciated risk management implications are addressed in Chapter 5.
62 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Protocol Concerning Regional 
Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in 
Cases of Emergency; adopted 1978, in force 1979; and Protocol concerning Marine 
Pollution resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf; 
adopted 1989, in force 1990, viewed 6 September 2012, <http://www.unep.org/
regionalseas/programmes/nonunep/ropme/instruments/default.asp>.
63 UNEP, Kuwait Convention, loc. cit.
64 See the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) website <http://www.
unep.org/> for details.
49
Chapter 4
asia PaciFic
ReGiONAl SAfety ANd SecuRity 
chAlleNGeS
The immense scale and geographic extent of offshore oil and gas activity in the often crowded waters of the Asia Pacific means there are many safety and security challenges. This chapter will 
consider a range of safety and security risks that confront regional and 
extra-regional actors: regulatory/man-induced; the prospect of armed 
conflict; law and order at sea issues; increasing maritime user intensity; 
natural hazards; and decommissioned installations.
Man-induced Risks and Regulatory Failures
The significant majority of major offshore oil and gas safety incidents 
around the world, as indicated by the summary at Annex A to Chapter 2, 
have been attributed to man-induced hazards resulting from human error, 
technology or equipment failures, regulatory failures, or a combination 
of these. As discussed in detail at Chapter 2, increasing production pres-
sures are compelling the offshore oil and gas sector into deeper and more 
remote waters at the leading edge of human experience and technological 
capacity. Political, commercial and financial pressures combine to promote 
risk taking and to undermine regulatory regimes that are inadequately 
constituted, resourced and experienced. Cumulative risks mount to pre-
sent circumstances where systemic safety incidents are certain to occur.
 The massive expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploi-
tation activity in the often busy waters of the Asia Pacific region presents 
an increasing likelihood of man-induced safety incidents that pose sig-
nificant collective risks to the region. The incidence of well blowouts 
and leaks for example, is likely to increase. There will be more accidents 
with ever greater consequences in the future, exacerbated in areas like 
the South China Sea by peculiar vulnerabilities resulting from regional 
geography and ecology, and multinational companies operating across 
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multiple regulatory regimes and sometimes doubtful national jurisdic-
tions. The conclusions drawn from an analysis of incidents elsewhere, 
and summarised at Chapter 2, will generally apply and are not repeated 
here. Asia Pacific states, regional cooperative entities and companies 
have the opportunity to learn from experiences elsewhere and to impose 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies.
regional armed conflict
As energy demand rises and the scramble to access offshore resources 
increase so do tensions among countries that claim ownership to vari-
ous parts of the region’s waters. The heightened significance for regional 
security of increasing offshore oil and gas activities can be seen in 
escalating boundary delimitation disputes and claims between states, 
particularly in the South and East China Seas. The prospect of regional 
tensions degenerating into armed conflict cannot be discounted.
 The efforts of the multiple protagonists to promote claims to sover-
eignty are indicated by the various applications of national names to sig-
nificant geographical features. For example, the semi-enclosed sea that lies 
in the southwest corner of the Pacific Ocean (the Southeast Asian corner), 
and is bounded and to various extents claimed by multiple littoral states, 
is referred to as the South China Sea by China (and the West), the West 
Philippine Sea by the Philippines, and the East Sea by Vietnam.
Escalating tensions
The competition for access to undersea resources is intense in the South 
China Sea, particularly around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. 
There are also significant and growing tensions in the East China Sea, 
as evinced by numerous ongoing sovereignty disputes, for example: 
between Japan and South Korea over islands known as Takeshima (Japan) 
and Dokdo (South Korea),1 the Kuril Islands dispute between Japan and 
1 Kang Hyun-kyung and Chung Min-uck, “Lee’s Dokdo trip presses Japan”, Korea 
Times, 11 August 2012, viewed 20 August 2012, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2012/08/116_117130.html>. South Korean President Lee 
Myung-bak’s visit to the disputed Dodko (Takeshima) Islands in August 2012 
caused a significant diplomatic incident indicative of wider territorial antipathy in 
the East China Sea.
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Russia,2 and the Senkaku (Japan)/Diaoyutai (China/Taiwan) Islands 
dispute between China, Japan and Taiwan.3
 China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim all of the Spratly Islands area (also 
called Nansha Islands by China and Taiwan), while Malaysia, the Philip-
pines and Brunei variously occupy and lay claim to some of the islands 
and isolated features.4 See Cordner (1994)5 for an assessment of the 
various claimants’ positions and their validity in respect of UNCLOS.6
 Efforts to put aside sovereignty claims to facilitate mutually beneficial 
exploration for offshore oil and gas have been made, as proposed by the 
2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
2 Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev reportedly visited the islands on 3 
July 2012 creating a diplomatic incident between Russia and Japan, see RT.com, 
“Medvedev visits Kuril Islands – ‘important part of Russian land’”, 3 July 2012, 
viewed 7 September 2012, <http://rt.com/politics/medvedev-kuril-islands-
visit-284/>. An historical summary of the Kurile Islands dispute can be found at 
<http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/KURILE.HTM>, viewed 7 September 2012.
Link copied to clipboard
3 For a summary of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai recent disputes and history see 
GlobalSecurity.org, “Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands”, August 2012, Viewed 7 
September 2012, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.
htm>.
4 China occupies seven areas (Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Gaven, Hughes, Johnson, 
Mischief, and Subi); Taiwan occupies one (Itu Aba, also known as Taiping Island); 
Vietnam 21 areas (Alison, Amboyan, Barque Canada, Central London, Cornwallis 
South, East London, Da Gri-san, Da Hi Gen, Great Discovery, Ladd, Landsdowne, 
Pearson, Petley, Sand, Sin Cowe, South Reef, South West Cay, Spratly, Tennent, 
and West London); parts are claimed by Malaysia (which occupies 3- Ardasier, 
Mariveles and Swallow Reefs); and the Philippines (which occupies 8 areas- 
Loaita, Nanshan, West York, Lamkian Cay, Thitu, North East Cay, Flat, and 
Commodore Reef ); in 1984, Brunei established an exclusive fishing zone that 
encompasses Louisa Reef in the southern Spratly Islands but has not publicly 
claimed the island.
5 Lee G. Cordner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea”, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Volume 25, 1994, pp. 61–74.
6 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994.
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China Sea (DoC).7 Article 68 was used as the basis for a primarily com-
mercial agreement to conduct joint research for petroleum resources 
between oil companies from Vietnam, China, and the Philippines in 
2005.9 In announcing the arrangement, the Parties were careful not to 
compromise sovereignty claims.10 Progress since the agreement and 
the DoC was signed has not been smooth with numerous allegations of 
transgressions. Parties are invited to “exercise self-restraint in the con-
duct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect 
peace and stability including ... refraining from action of inhabiting on 
... uninhabited islands ... and other features and to handle their differ-
ences in a constructive manner”.11 Alleged transgressions of the DoC, 
along with major development activity on many tiny, low lying South 
7 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 
November 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, viewed 7 September 2012, <http://
www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>.
8 Ibid. Article 6 invites Parties to “explore or undertake cooperative activities” 
including marine scientific research.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, press release “Oil 
companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed Agreement on South 
China Sea Cooperation”, SRC-241, 15 March 2005. A Tripartite Agreement 
for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in The Agreement Area in the South 
Sea was signed on 14 March 2005 in Manila, Philippines, by and among China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation 
(PetroVietnam), and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), viewed 15 
August 2012, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm>.
10 Ibid. China stated that the agreement “will not undermine the basic positions 
held by their respective Governments on the South China Sea issue and will 
contribute to the transformation of the South China Sea into an area of peace, 
stability, cooperation, and development in accordance with the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
11 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, op. cit.
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China Sea islands and other features12 plus major increases in military 
and naval activity in the area are clearly at odds with the spirit and intent 
of the DoC.13
Increasing maritime force capabilities
Adding to security concerns arising from strident diplomatic 
exchanges between the South China Sea protagonists is the signifi-
cant and sustained increase in military expenditure by several Asian 
countries. Whether this can be typified as a general regional arms 
race is not clear, with Asia and Oceania reported to have increased 
overall military spending by 2.3 per cent in 2011.14 China, India and 
Vietnam have each increased military spending massively over the 
past decade and Russia and Indonesia have also significantly increased 
12 There are a large number of reports of new structures and military outposts on 
low lying islands, atolls and reefs on the Spratly and Paracel Island areas. For 
example: in September the Philippines accused China of building new structures 
on Mischief Reef, which lies close to the Philippines and within the area of 
overlapping claims (Alexis Romero, “China expanding Mischief structures”, The 
Philippine Star, 3 September 2012, viewed 6 September 2012, <http://www.
philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=844730&publicationSubCategoryId=63>). 
Similarly, Taiwan is reported to have created significant structures on the largest 
Spratly feature, Itu Aba (Taiping) Island; and China is reported to be establishing 
a “prefectural-level city named Sansha based on Woody (Yongxing) Island in the 
Paracels (Xisha) archipelago” with a “division-level garrison” (see Dennis J. Blasko 
and M. Taylor Fravel, “Much ado about the Sansha Garrison”, The Diplomat, 23 
August 2012, viewed 25 August 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/23/
much-ado-about-the-sansha-garrison/>).
13 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, op. 
cit. Article 7 states that Declaration has the “purpose of promoting good 
neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding 
and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes”.
14 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPPI), “Background paper on 
SIPRI military expenditure data, 2011”, 17 April 2012, viewed 10 September 2012, 
<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex>.
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expenditure.15 Much of the arms expenditure continues to be on quan-
titative increases and qualitative improvements to naval capabilities, 
particularly in acquiring modern surface combatants, submarines, 
large amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers, sea and air based mis-
sile systems and electronic warfare systems.16 One analyst noted that 
“Asia has now been involved in a sustained build-up of defence capa-
bilities for two decades”17 while another analyst optimistically suggests 
qualitative and quantitative improvements in naval capabilities’ across 
the region could result in improved maritime security cooperation.18
What are the risks of armed conflict?
Armed conflict risk assessments require consideration of both capability 
and intent. In the South China Sea, and indeed other parts of the Asia 
Pacific, the capability of many nations to wage war at sea is improv-
ing and, when combined with efforts to stake claims over the oceans 
resources, generate valid perceptions of increasing intent to use armed 
force. The likelihood of armed conflict at sea is increasing while the 
consequences of armed exchanges, given qualitative and quantitative 
capability improvements, are also significantly increasing.
 The prospect of regional, or extra-regional, states using armed force 
to protect territorial and resource interests must be weighed against 
broader mutual interests in maintaining peace and good order at sea, 
particularly to sustain the uninterrupted flow of maritime trade essen-
15 Ibid. China is reported to have increased military expenditure by 170 per cent 
since 2002, consistently maintaining approximately 2 per cent of GDP; India has 
increased spending by 66 per cent since 2002; Vietnam has increased military 
spending by 82 per cent since 2003; Indonesian military spending has increased 
by 82 per cent since 2002; and Russia, also a Pacific power, has increased military 
spending by 16 per cent in real terms since 2008, including a 9.3 per cent increase 
in 2011.
16 Desmond Ball, “Asia’s naval arms race: Myth or reality?”. Paper prepared for the 
25th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 29 May – 1 June 2011, p. 
5, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://www.isis.org.my/files/25APR/paper_cs_2_
desmond_ball.pdf>.
17 Ibid, p. 15.
18 Sukjoon Yoon, “The dilemma of naval modernisation in East Asia”, RSIS 
Commentaries, No. 168/2012, 11 September 2012, viewed 12 September 2012, 
<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/>.
Chapter 4
Asia Pacific: Regional Safety and Security Challenges
55
tial to regional and extra-regional economies. On balance, given the 
mutually negative impacts for regional countries of war, armed conflict 
between states over maritime boundary delimitation claims and alleged 
transgressions of offshore oil and gas activity are more likely to be local 
and contained than to degenerate into wider regional conflict. That said, 
the risks of armed conflict due to miscalculation by overly aggressive 
local commanders is increasing as protagonists in the South China Sea 
expand deployed naval capabilities and reinforce military garrisons on 
remote, tiny islands and other features.
 Apart from the immediate risks of damage to oil and gas facilities 
and vessels, the attendant loss of life and environmental damage, and 
global economic impacts, the possibility of a local conflict widening to 
regional conflict cannot be discounted. The related importance of global 
and regional conflict resolution regimes and internationally agreed 
mechanisms for managing the consequences are emphasised; the low 
levels of accession of regional nations’ to such agreements and arrange-
ments must be viewed with concern.
Law and Order at Sea Risks
In the increasingly congested waters of the Asia Pacific, particularly in 
areas like the South China Sea, a rise in law and order incidents could 
reasonably be expected. However, so far there have been no appreci-
able increases in piracy and armed robbery or maritime terrorism in 
the region. The risks to offshore oil and gas safety and security arising 
from law and order at sea incidents are generally low although the con-
sequences could be severe.
Piracy and armed robbery
The major areas of piracy attacks are off parts of Africa, particularly 
Somalia and Nigeria.19 Piracy remains a concern in Asia with the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (ISC) 
19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of 
Maritime Transport 2011, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://unctad.org/en/
Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf>, pp. 119–121.
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reporting a reduced incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in Asia during January-June 2012 compared to the same periods of 2010 
and 2011.20 Of particular relevance was a reduction in the incidence of 
piracy and armed robbery in the South China Sea, including Malaysian 
waters and the Malacca and Singapore Straits.21 There were no reported 
incidents in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.22 The vast major-
ity of incidents involved petty theft primarily against vessels at anchor; 
incidents related to the oil and gas sector were primarily against small, 
slow local oil tankers.23
 Large fixed oil and gas installations are difficult targets for pirates 
although significant attacks have been reported elsewhere in the world, 
particularly off Nigeria, where local militants have been intent upon 
disrupting the oil industry.24 FPSOs, FSUs and tankers, particularly when 
fully laden, and oil tender vessels, present easier targets and are more 
likely to be targets for piracy and armed robbery.
Maritime terrorism
The likelihood of terrorist attacks on the global energy sector, although 
low, continues to be of concern. Similar to the piracy case, large fixed 
offshore oil and gas installations present difficult targets for terrorists, 
although the risks must be viewed as real and credible, as major damage 
can be inflicted that will have global security and economic consequenc-
es.25 The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks in India have required govern-
20 ReCAAP ISC, “Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, half yearly report, 
January to June 2012”, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://www.recaap.org/>.
21 Ibid., p. 3. Malaysia reported the lowest number of incidents during compared 
to the same period in the past four years. The South China Sea and the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore reported a 71 per cent and 50 per cent decrease in the 
number of incidents during January-June 2012 compared to the same period in 
2011.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
23 Ibid., pp. 9–10, 24–25 and 28–29.
24 Mikhail Kashubsky, “Offshore energy force majeure: Nigeria’s local problem with 
global consequences”, Maritime Studies, 160, May/June 2008, viewed 15 January 
2011, <http://www.austlii.edu.au> .
25 S. Bajpai and J. P. Gupta, “Securing oil and gas infrastructure”, Journal of 
Petroleum Science and Engineering, 55 (2007), 174–186.
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ments to re-focus attention upon maritime areas as presenting both 
potential terrorist targets and being a source of projecting terrorism 
ashore.26 The risks to regional facilities must be considered, including 
from non-conventional attacks intended to disrupt operations.27
Risks Associated with Increasing Maritime User Intensity
In addition to rapidly increasing offshore oil and gas exploration and 
development activity, the incidence of shipping operations, after Global 
Financial Crisis setbacks in 2009, grew by seven per cent in 2010 with the 
major increases in Asia.28 Shipping traffic density through the western 
Pacific remains high, particularly through the key Straits to the south and 
north of the South China Sea (Singapore, Malacca, Taiwan and Luzon 
Straits), and regional fishing activity remains intense. More than 70,000 
vessels annually transit the Malacca Strait and the figure could be con-
siderably higher according to informed calculations.29
 A busier and more crowded maritime environment raises the 
likelihood of man-induced safety incidents arising from human 
errors and technological malfunctions, like collisions and oil spills. 
Intense rivalry between South China Sea claimants and protagonist 
for resources has already led to tense incidents,30 including reported 
26 V. K. Shashikumar, “Gaps in Maritime Security-I”, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 
24 No. 1, January – March 2009, 27 November 2010, viewed 15 January 2011, 
<http://www.indiandefencereview.com> .
27 For example: cyber-attacks.
28 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2011, op. cit., pp. 7–12. Asia is by far 
the most important loading and unloading area for maritime trade globally with 
40 per cent of total goods loaded and 55 per cent of goods unloaded.
29 Definitive data on Malacca Strait shipping activity is difficult to find. 
One informed estimate, compiled from a variety of sources, suggests that 
approximately 126,000 vessel transit, arrivals and departures occur annually. 
Figures commonly quoted are between 50,000 and 70,000 shipping transits per 
annum but these are considered to be incomplete estimates.
30 Jason Miks, “China, Philippines in standoff”, The Diplomat, 11 April 2012, 
viewed 12 April 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/04/11/china-
philippines-in-standoff/>.
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loss of life, between naval forces and fishing vessels.31 Placing a defini-
tive risk value on the implications for the offshore oil and gas sector 
of increased maritime user intensity is not feasible however interac-
tions and competition between multiple users of the maritime space 
can be expected to grow, increasing the likelihood of accidents and 
incidents.
Safety zones
The increased likelihood of unauthorised activities in close proximity 
to oil and gas installations (e.g. fishing, diving or tourism) presenting 
safety and security risks, is a concern in many areas. The internation-
ally mandated 500 meter safety zones32 are not wide enough to provide 
adequate space to warn or intercept intruders. This matter was consid-
ered at the 56th session of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation in July 2010, with guidelines to 
increase awareness and routing around the zones proposed, but not to 
increase the size of safety zones.33
 The Australian Gas Resources Sector Security Inquiry,34 completed 
in June 2012, confirmed the inadequacy of safety zones in the Australian 
offshore oil and gas context. The inquiry found that zones are too small 
to be effective, breaches are largely unenforceable and facility operators 
do not have realistic opportunities to implement defensive measures or 
evacuation strategies; “a graded multi-layered security zone approach, 
31 GMA News Online, “Victims from ‘Chinese’ ramming now 1 dead, 1 injured, 
4 missing”, 24 June 2012, viewed 24 June 2012, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/
news/story/263018/news/regions/victims-from-chinese-ramming-now-1-dead-
1-injured-4-missing>.
32 United Nations, UNCLOS, op. cit., Article 60.
33 IMO Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, 56th session: 26–30 July 2010, IMO 
Media Release, 30 November 2010, <http://www.imo.org> (3 March 2011).
34 Office of the Inspector of Transport Security, Gas Resources Sector Security 
Inquiry, Australian Government, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 
June 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/
transport/security/oits/files/Offshore_Oil_and_Gas_Resources_Sector_Security_
Inquiry.pdf>, pp. 4–5.
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which would provide more effective protection” was recommended. 
35 Rig operators are very limited in the enforcement powers they can 
legally apply; this remains an area of significant vulnerability for both 
safety and security.
Risks Arising from Natural Hazards
The Asia Pacific region is identified as “the most hazard prone region in 
the World”36 due primarily to the high indigence of typhoons, cyclones 
and earthquakes. Risks to safety from natural hazards, particularly 
extreme weather events and seismic activity, are growing as the offshore 
oil and gas sector in the Asia Pacific region expands and the incidence 
of extreme weather events increases due to climate change. Conse-
quences that must be addressed in risk management strategies include 
the prospect of massive environmental disasters that transcend national 
boundaries. In crowded regional waters the results of incidents can 
quickly extend beyond individual national jurisdictions.37
 Food security may be profoundly affected by massive marine pollu-
tion, which is of major concern across most of Asia where seafood is a 
major source of protein in local diets, and where the livelihood of coastal 
communities may be severely affected.38 Significant financial conse-
35 Ibid., p. 5.
36 See “adpc strategy 2020: Towards a Safer Asia – Building resilience through 
innovation and partnerships”, viewed 24 January 2013, <http://www.adpc.
net/2012/?>.
37 As was reported to have occurred in the Montara case off northern Australia 
where the spill was alleged to have spread into Indonesian waters. WWF 
Australia, “One year after Montara spill Indonesia advancing claims”, 26 August 
2010, viewed 15 January 2011, <http://www.wwf.org.au>.
38 Jenny Blinch, Benjamin McCarron and Katie Yewdall; Lucy Carmody (Ed.), 
“The future of fish in Asia”, Responsible Research, September 2011, viewed 10 
September 2012, <http://www.responsibleresearch.com/The_Future_of_Fish_in_
Asia-Issues_for_Responsible_Investors.pdf >, p. 2. The Asian region dominates 
the global fishing industry in capture quantities, number of people employed, 
consumption and number of vessels in operation. Over 85 percent of all fishers 
and fish farmers in 2008 were Asian, as were six of the top ten producer countries 
in capture fishing.
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quences that may be incurred include: increased insurance premiums, 
clean-up costs, compensation, and (usually short-term) impacts on world 
oil and gas prices.39
Weather and earthquakes
Typhoons or tropical cyclones cause costly and deadly natural disasters 
affecting much of South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia and Australasia. 
Typhoons are particularly prevalent in the East and South China Seas, 
with the northwest Pacific Ocean recognised as the area with the most 
numerous and intense tropical cyclones globally, while northern Aus-
tralia is also prone to frequent and intense cyclonic activity. The climate 
change induced increase in the incidence and severity of extreme weather 
events is likely to have major impacts in Asia Pacific tropical and sub-
tropical areas.40 Earthquakes and tsunamis also present major risks as 
much of the region falls within two of the world’s major seismic activity 
areas, the Circum-Pacific Belt and the Alpide Belt, that extend east from 
the Mediterranean Sea through Indonesia and around the western Pacific 
Rim from New Zealand to Russia.
 The high likelihood of extreme natural events present major risks 
of catastrophic incidents in Asia Pacific offshore oil and gas sectors that 
may have regional as well as national implications. Around the world, 
installations have sustained significant weather damage that has caused 
major environmental and other hazards on numerous occasions.41 Much 
research continues into how offshore oil and gas exploration and exploi-
tation facilities will cope with extreme weather events in waters that 
are deeper and further offshore. The current practice of shutting down 
rigs and evacuating personnel in the event of approaching typhoons or 
39 As occurred in the Deepwater Horizon incident. See U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Report, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Preliminary 
Assessment of Federal Financial Risks and Cost Reimbursement and Notification 
Policies and Procedures, 12 November 2010, viewed 15 January 201, <http://www.
rfflibrary.wordpress.com>.
40 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report, viewed 15 January 2011, <http://www.ipcc.ch>.
41 See the summary in Annex A to Chapter 2.
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cyclones may not be sufficient to avert catastrophe in the future. Oil and 
gas support vessels and attending tankers are also at risk.
Risks from Decommissioned Platforms
The numbers of decommissioned offshore oil and gas platforms in the 
Asia Pacific will increase as existing, older platforms near their end of 
life. The incidence of derelict facilities will significantly increase into the 
future due to the large number of new installations. The risks posed by 
abandoned rigs include hazards to navigation and other users of the area, 
and increased environmental hazards. Abandoned or disused installa-
tions or structures are required to be removed under international law42 
and IMO guidelines specify how this is to occur.43 It is incumbent upon 
regional governments to have regulatory regimes in place to ensure that 
decommissioned installations are properly dealt with.
42 UNCLOS, Article 60.
43 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines and Standards for the Removal 
of Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone 1989, (1989 IMO Resolution A.672(16)).
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Chapter 5
POLicy rEsPONsE
PracticEs aND OPtiONs
This chapter explores Asia Pacific regional maritime safety and security policy response practices and options, as they apply to the offshore oil and gas sector. A key feature is the low incidence of 
accession by regional countries to international regimes designed to help 
manage risks and aid coordination of incident prevention, response and 
recovery, along with an associated lack of region-wide maritime security 
and safety cooperation. Another key issue is the vulnerability resulting 
from jurisdictional uncertainty where the geographical limits of national 
responsibilities and obligations for safety and security may be unclear. 
The criticality of these issues was recognised by the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which convened a multi-
national, regional Study Group that resulted in CSCAP Memorandum No. 
16 Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, published in 
January 2011, the full text of which, including Annex A “List of Relevant 
International Conventions, Regional Instruments and Other Documents”, 
is attached at Annex A to this Chapter.1 Annex B to the CSCAP Memo-
randum, “Table of Ratification or Accession of Treaties by ARF/CSCAP 
Member States”, has been updated and is included as Table 1 in this chapter.
Compliance with International Regimes and Regional 
Cooperation
Regional governments are understandably keen to exploit their offshore 
resources. Exercising rights to resource access generates obligations for 
responsible management, including adoption and implementation of 
relevant international regimes. Given the crowded geography and shared 
vulnerabilities, regional governments should derive considerable benefit 
1 Lee Cordner was co-chair for this Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group.
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from entering into cooperative arrangements with neighbouring littoral 
states, and regional and extra-regional maritime user states, to protect 
convergent interests. Offshore incidents are likely to have national, 
regional and global consequences that transcend national boundaries.
 Table 1 presents a summary of ratification or accession by regional states 
of key treaties. The adoption rate among many states prominent in offshore 
oil and gas activity in the region is low, and related regional cooperative 
arrangements and architectures are lacking. This is of particular concern 
in regard to the security, safety of life at sea, and marine environmental 
protection regimes that have special significance for this industry.
Marine pollution and environmental protection
Chapter 3 considered cooperative regional approaches to marine pol-
lution prevention, response and recovery utilising UNCLOS,2 the 1972 
London Convention3 and 1996 Dumping Protocol,4 and the International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
1990 (OPRC 1990).5 Regional agreements drawn from these international 
conventions and protocols generally do not yet exist in the Asia Pacific 
region. Rectifying this deficiency should become a priority for regional 
governments and regional cooperative entities as they seek to mitigate 
safety and security risks from offshore oil and gas activity.
Maritime safety and security
Many Asia Pacific regional states are also not parties to international 
conventions and protocols on maritime safety and security. Many states 
have not ratified or acceded to: the International Convention on Mari-
2 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 
10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994.
3 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other 
Matters 1972 (1972 London Convention), adopted 29 December 1972, entered 
into force generally 30 August 1975.
4 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 (1996 Dumping Protocol), adopted 7 
November 1996, entered into force generally 24 March 2006.
5 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation 1990 (OPRC 1990), adopted 30 November 1990, entered into force 
generally 13 May 1995.
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time Search and Rescue, 1979;6 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)7 and the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code Amendments;8 
and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988),9 the related 1988 SUA Pro-
tocol (Protocol, 1988)10 on fixed platforms, or the 2005 SUA Protocols.11 
There has been recent progress with Indonesia formally acceding to 
the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR 
Convention).12 While there are numerous bilateral and multilateral 
security arrangements in the region, region-wide, multi-lateral maritime 
safety and security regimes are not in place.
Maritime boundary delimitations
Regional cooperation is difficult because many maritime boundaries 
between littoral states have not been delimited. Until recently, offshore 
oil and gas activity has primarily been in areas where national jurisdic-
tion is not contested. Increasingly, as outlined in Chapter 4, offshore oil 
and gas activity is occurring in the South and East China Seas where 
maritime boundary delimitation disputes abound.13 Unresolved maritime 
6 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, adopted 27 April 
1979, entered into force generally 22 June 1985.
7 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), adopted 1 
November 1974, entered into force generally 25 May 1980.
8 Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 Contained in Resolutions 1, 2, 6 and 7 of The Conference of 
Contracting Governments and The International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code, London, 12 December 2002, entered into force 1 July 2004.
9 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA 1988), adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force generally 1 March 1992.
10 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1988 SUA Protocol), adopted 10 March 
1988, entered into force generally 1 March 1992.
11 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 SUA Protocols), entered into force generally 
28 July 2010.
12 International Maritime Organization (IMO), “Indonesia ratifies several IMO 
instruments”, Briefing: 33, 28 August 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://
www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx>.
13 See Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries 
of the Asian Rim in the Pacific Ocean”, in S. Furness (Ed.), Maritime Briefing, 
Volume 3 Number 1, 2001.
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boundary issues present points of extreme sensitivity between regional 
states, particularly in East Asia and Southeast Asia; they are complex and 
there are no easy solutions. Notably, even in Track II diplomacy there is 
unwillingness among some national delegations to discuss sovereignty 
and boundary issues.14 Regional maritime cooperation dialogue and 
arrangements are significantly complicated by seemingly irresolvable 
sovereignty issues. This is of particular concern given the proliferation 
of offshore oil and gas activity where the geographical limits of national 
responsibilities and obligations for safety and security may be unclear.
 Regional commentators continue to urge protagonists to adopt concilia-
tory and compromise approaches to disagreements. It has variously been 
suggested that international arbitration or adjudication be sought to resolve 
sovereignty disputes;15 that a cooperative management regime be established 
for the South China Sea comprised of all bordering countries;16 and that 
UNCLOS provisions be used to clarify the areas of overlapping maritime 
claims that would lead to negotiations for provisional arrangements, includ-
ing joint development agreements.17 So far, there has been little appetite for 
negotiation or compromise, particularly using UNCLOS.18 Perhaps the need 
for regional approaches to offshore oil and gas safety and security will, in the 
future, present a catalyst for increased regional cooperation?
14 During Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Study 
Group deliberations, hosted by Vietnam in Da Nang 6–8 October 2010, some 
delegates refused to countenance sovereignty issues. They had to be put aside to 
enable agreement to be attained on CSCAP Memorandum No. 16, Safety and 
Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, January 2011, viewed 3 March 
2011, <http://www.cscap.org/> .
15 Dato’ Muthiah Alagappa, “Rethinking territorial disputes in the South China Sea: 
Transforming problem into opportunity”, RSIS Commentaries, No. 166/2012, 5 
September 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/>.
16 Sam Bateman, “Increasing competition in the South China Sea – Need for a 
new game plan”, RSIS Commentaries, No. 157/2012, 21 August 2012, viewed 24 
August 2012, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/>.
17 Robert Beckman, “The South China Sea disputes: How states can clarify their 
maritime claims”, RSIS Commentaries, No. 140/2012, 31 July 2012, viewed 12 
August 2012, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/>.
18 See Lee Cordner, “The Spratly Islands dispute and the Law of the Sea”, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Volume 25, 1994, pp. 61–74 for an analysis 
of claimants’ positions relevant to UNCLOS.
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1 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. 
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the 
Convention and the related Agreements 3 June 2011.
treaties
States
1982 uNclOS1 1974 SOlAS2 1988 SuA2 1988 SuA 
Protocol2
1990 OPRc2 1972 london 
convention2
1996 dumping 
Protocol2
1979 Search and 
Rescue2
AS
eA
N 
M
em
be
r S
tat
es
Brunei 1996r 1986a 2003r 2003r        
Cambodia s 1994a 2006a 2006a        
Indonesia 1986r 1981a           2012a 
Laos 1998r              
Malaysia 1996r 1983a     1997a      
Myanmar 1996r 1987a 2003a 2003a        
Philippines 1984r 1981a 2004r 2004r s 1973r 2012n   
Singapore 1994r 1981a 2004a   1999a     1997a
Thailand 2011r 1984a     2000a      
Vietnam 1994r 1990a 2000a 2002a       2007a
AS
eA
N 
di
alo
gu
e P
ar
tn
er
s
Australia 1994r 1983a 1993a 1993a 1992a 1985r 2000r 1983a
Canada 2003r 1978a 1993r 1993r 1994a 1975r 2000a 1982a
China 1996r 1980r 1991r 1991r 1998a 1985a 2006r 1985ar
European Union 1998fc              
India 1995r 1976a 1999a 1999a 1997a   2001a
Japan 1996r 1980a 1998a 1998a 1995a 1980r 2007a 1985a
New Zealand 1996r 1990a 1999r 1999r 1999a 1975r 2001r 1985a
Republic of Korea 1996r 1980r 2003a 2003a 1999a 1993a 2009a 1995a
Russia 1997r 1980ap 2001r 2001r 2009a 1975r   1988r
United States 1978r 1994r 1994r 1992r 1974r s 1980r
AS
eA
N 
Ob
se
rv
er
Papua New Guinea 2012n 2012n 2012n
Bangladesh 2001r 1981a 2005a 2005a 2004a      
DPR of Korea s 1985a   2005a        
East Timor              
Mongolia 1996r 2002a            
Pakistan 1997r 1985a 2000a 2000a 1993a 1995   1985a
Sri Lanka 1994r 1983a 2000a          
TABLE 1
Ratification or Accession of treaties by Asia Pacific States19
19 CSCAP, Memorandum No. 16, op. cit. Table from the Memorandum adapted and 
updated, current at 31 August 2012, viewed 11 September 2012, <http://www.
imo.org and <http://www.un.org >.
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treaties
States
1982 uNclOS1 1974 SOlAS2 1988 SuA2 1988 SuA 
Protocol2
1990 OPRc2 1972 london 
convention2
1996 dumping 
Protocol2
1979 Search and 
Rescue2
AS
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r S
tat
es
Brunei 1996r 1986a 2003r 2003r        
Cambodia s 1994a 2006a 2006a        
Indonesia 1986r 1981a           2012a 
Laos 1998r              
Malaysia 1996r 1983a     1997a      
Myanmar 1996r 1987a 2003a 2003a        
Philippines 1984r 1981a 2004r 2004r s 1973r 2012n   
Singapore 1994r 1981a 2004a   1999a     1997a
Thailand 2011r 1984a     2000a      
Vietnam 1994r 1990a 2000a 2002a       2007a
AS
eA
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di
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e P
ar
tn
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s
Australia 1994r 1983a 1993a 1993a 1992a 1985r 2000r 1983a
Canada 2003r 1978a 1993r 1993r 1994a 1975r 2000a 1982a
China 1996r 1980r 1991r 1991r 1998a 1985a 2006r 1985ar
European Union 1998fc              
India 1995r 1976a 1999a 1999a 1997a   2001a
Japan 1996r 1980a 1998a 1998a 1995a 1980r 2007a 1985a
New Zealand 1996r 1990a 1999r 1999r 1999a 1975r 2001r 1985a
Republic of Korea 1996r 1980r 2003a 2003a 1999a 1993a 2009a 1995a
Russia 1997r 1980ap 2001r 2001r 2009a 1975r   1988r
United States 1978r 1994r 1994r 1992r 1974r s 1980r
AS
eA
N 
Ob
se
rv
er
Papua New Guinea 2012n 2012n 2012n
Bangladesh 2001r 1981a 2005a 2005a 2004a      
DPR of Korea s 1985a   2005a        
East Timor              
Mongolia 1996r 2002a            
Pakistan 1997r 1985a 2000a 2000a 1993a 1995   1985a
Sri Lanka 1994r 1983a 2000a          
2 International Maritime Organization. Status of Multilateral Conventions and 
Instruments in respect of which the IMO or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary 
or other functions 31 August 2012. 
r ratification a accession ap acceptance fc formal confirmation ar approval s signatory n 
accession date not known
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Risk Management Consequences
The low incidence of accession or ratification and therefore compli-
ance with and implementation of international regimes in the region 
combined with maritime boundary delimitation uncertainty is of major 
concern to offshore oil and gas safety and security risk management. The 
readiness and willingness of regional states to set necessary regulatory 
standards and attend to international obligations for maritime safety, 
security and environmental protection are in doubt. Boundary and there-
fore jurisdictional uncertainty could be used by nations and industry to 
avoid obligations in the event of major crises.
 There have been allegations of major oil spill incidents being reported 
late or where an event has been denied despite evidence to the contrary. 
A case in point was an offshore rig oil spill reported to have occurred in 
June 2011 in China’s largest offshore oil field in Bohai Bay “equivalent to 
the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico” that spread over 320 square miles. The 
Chinese government reported the spill at a press conference a month after 
the incident and claimed it had already been cleaned up.20 Subsequent 
reporting suggested further leaks, massive environmental and fishing 
industry damage.21 A major concern here was the lack of timeliness and 
transparency with an incident that reportedly had significant environ-
mental impact, serious implications for industry, and potentially, conse-
quences for neighbouring states. The inference of a culture of secrecy in 
such circumstances does not bode well given the increasing likelihood and 
massive consequences of such incidents in the Asia Pacific, particularly in 
the crowded waters of the South and East China Seas.
 Importantly, industry may be presented with opportunities to 
20 The incident was subject to various media reports: Andrew Jacobs, “China 
offshore oil spill spreads 320 square miles”, New York Times, 6 July 2011; Chosun 
Media, “China admits massive oil spill in Bohai Bay”, The Chosunilbo, 6 July 
2011, viewed 12 September 2012, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2011/07/06/2011070601098.html>; and RFI English, “U.S. oil giant admits 
to massive China oil spill”, 12 August 2011, viewed 12 September 2012, <http://
www.english.rfi.fr/asia-pacific/20110812-us-oil-giant-admits-massive-china-oil-
spill>.
21 People’s Daily Online – English, “ConocoPhillips admits discovery of new oil spill 
source in China’s Bohai Bay”, 13 August 2011, viewed 12 September 2012, <http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90882/7568346.html>.
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exploit jurisdictional and regulatory uncertainties and inconsistencies, 
and political rivalries, between neighbouring states. Many offshore oil 
and gas companies operate in multiple jurisdictions, consistent stand-
ards of compliance are highly desirable from an industry perspective. 
States that have poorly developed regulatory regimes are opening the 
way for unscrupulous operators to apply lesser standards of safety and 
security, thereby increasing risks. As discussed in Chapter 2, even 
in jurisdictions like the U.S. and Australia that have well developed 
regulatory regimes, mature oil and gas industries, and where jurisdic-
tion is clear there have been and will continue to be major incidents 
resulting from regulatory, technical or operational failures, weather 
events and accidents at sea.
 At regional and international levels, the possibility for misunder-
standings between states are raised if they are not operating from com-
monly derived legislative bases and within clearly defined geographical 
boundaries. Regional, national and industry prevention, response and 
recovery arrangements and measures are unnecessarily complicated 
and inefficient due to inconsistent approaches combined with the lack 
of cooperation.
Damage to reputation
Another consequence that must be considered by regional govern-
ments, and the industry, is the damage to reputation if major incidents 
occur, particularly if prevention, response and recovery arrangements 
are found to be wanting. In both the West Atlas and Deepwater Horizon 
cases, under Australian and U.S. jurisdictions respectively, significant 
shortcomings in regulatory, response and recovery arrangements were 
revealed. The reputation of some regional states as good citizens of the 
world are likely to be significantly diminished by low levels of adoption 
and compliance with international regimes and their lack of preparedness 
to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of relatively 
hazardous offshore oil and gas operations.
Risk Mitigation and Treatment Options
Risk mitigation and treatment options that should be considered by 
Asia Pacific states at regional and national levels are outlined below. The 
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suggested options are aimed at addressing multiple risks across multiple 
jurisdictions.
Strategic risk assessment
The most compelling initial requirement is to fully understand the Asia 
Pacific offshore oil and gas integrated all risks context, and to estab-
lish strategic risk management frameworks. ISO 31000:2009 provides 
proven, internationally accepted guidance. Effective risk management 
partnerships between government and industry are highly desirable as 
outlined in Chapter 3. An initial regional strategic risk assessment would 
aim to establish the risk context. Subsequent steps could then be taken 
to identify, analyse and evaluate the risks leading to the development of 
regional and national risk treatment options.
 Such a risk assessment process could be coordinated under the 
auspices of regional consultative bodies like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF),22 East Asian Summit (EAS)23 or South Asian Associa-
tion for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).24 Participation by regional 
states could be voluntary with the intent of gaining mutually benefi-
cial understanding of the scope of the risk context that would inform 
judgments about cooperative and individual state approaches to 
managing the risks.
 An important part of the process, when identifying risks and vulner-
abilities, and the likelihood and consequences of certain risks arising, is 
to be clear from whose perspective the analysis is being conducted. The 
outcomes of risk assessments may be quite different when coming from 
a regional perspective, purely national perspectives, or from industry or 
company perspectives. Each entity will have different priorities, stake-
holders, cultures, and appetite for risk; and the implications and options 
for mitigating risk may be quite different. A company may simply take 
22 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), viewed 3 March 2011, <http://www.
aseanregionalforum.org>.
23 ASEAN, “About the East Asia Summit”, viewed 3 March 2011, <http://www.
aseansec.org/aadcp/repsf/abouteastasiasummit.html>.
24 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), viewed 13 
September 2012, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>. The member states are: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
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out insurance cover to mitigate a particular risk while a state may need 
to ensure international arrangements, regulatory regimes, and response 
measures are in place.
 Once an initial risk assessment has been conducted and a risk 
baseline established regular and comprehensive update assessments of 
the offshore oil and gas safety and security strategic risk profile would 
be required. Adopting a consistent approach to risk management and 
establishing viable risk management frameworks would be helpful to all 
parties participating in the risk management process. At an Asia Pacific 
regional level, a regional strategic risk management framework would 
provide the necessary cooperative bases to assist common risk under-
standing leading to the development of effective, cooperative approaches 
to mitigating and treating risks.
Government and industry cooperation
An essential requirement of effective risk management in the offshore 
oil and gas sector is recognition of the roles and responsibilities of 
industry and governments. Effective government-industry cooperative 
partnerships need to be encouraged that includes appropriate sharing of 
responsibilities for prevention, response and recovery. At a minimum, 
the following matters require consideration:
•	 A common appreciation of the real risks associated with offshore 
oil and gas needs to be developed;
•	 The responsibilities of governments and industry need to be 
defined so that individual and shared regional, national and 
industry obligations are recognised and evaluated to ensure that 
there are no gaps; and
•	 Effective cooperation and consistency is required regionally, 
nationally and with industry in dealing with issues like decommis-
sioned platforms, disaster and emergency response arrangements, 
and security cooperation.
Mutually beneficial cooperation
Developing joint strategies, arrangements, regimes and mechanisms to 
deal with offshore oil and gas safety and security risks presents a positive 
RSIS Monograph No. 26
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia Pacific: The Need for Regional 
Approaches to Managing Risks
72
and necessary opportunity for regional governments, in collaboration 
with industry, to develop mutually beneficial cooperation. Cooperation 
in this non-threatening context, in order to protect mutual interests, 
could improve goodwill and lead to wider maritime safety and security 
cooperation. Regional governments, with the support from affected 
extra-regional governments, need to find ways of putting aside sov-
ereignty disputes in order to focus upon mutual interests that include 
reducing the likelihood of regional conflict and regional environmental 
and economic disasters.
International Regime Adoption and Regional Cooperation
The emerging offshore oil and gas situation in the Asia Pacific region 
presents an important catalyst for encouraging regional governments 
and regional entities to make significant progress toward adopting and 
implementing relevant international regimes. International regimes have 
evolved over many years and are based upon experiences in many parts 
of the world. Collectively, they reinforce objectives of enhancing mari-
time safety and security, and marine environmental protection. It is in 
the national interests of Asia Pacific regional governments to proactively 
engage as this will support offshore oil and gas exploitation opportunities 
while addressing responsibilities and obligations, and managing risk.
International regime adoption
Regional governments are urged to ratify, observe and effectively imple-
ment a range of international conventions, regional instruments and 
other documents as a matter of priority. A consistent level of regional 
ratifications and accessions of international regimes would provide a 
sound, common basis for developing regional cooperation and setting 
consistent standards for industry. There are many international regimes 
that require attention. Listed in Table 1 are some of the key conventions 
and protocols that should be considered by regional governments.
Regional cooperative arrangements
The development of regional cooperative arrangements should be given 
very high priority. The potentially large scope and scale of offshore oil 
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and gas safety and security incidents, and the likelihood that the impacts 
will transcend national boundaries, support this imperative. This is par-
ticularly relevant in the crowded geography of parts of the Asia Pacific 
where littoral states will almost certainly require assistance in dealing 
with major incidents.
 There has recently been qualified progress in parts of the region 
although regional non-cooperation has been the more common prac-
tice. For example, the 2002 ASEAN China Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC)25 affirms the commitment of 
the Parties to pursue peaceful means and international law in settling 
disputes. It also encourages Parties26 to undertake cooperative activities. 
However, there has been little practical progress with cooperation so far 
and China and ASEAN member states have alleged multiple transgres-
sions of the DoC. ASEAN’s commitment to establishing a Regional Code 
of Conduct in the South China Sea (CoC), in order to operationalise the 
DoC, was belatedly reaffirmed after the July 2012 ASEAN meeting was 
initially unable to reach agreement to release a joint communiqué.27 
However, China has indicted that this is a longer-term goal so agreement 
and compliance with a CoC appears unlikely in the short-term.28 The 
DoC and the draft CoC emphasise resolving disputes through ASEAN 
frameworks and international law, however the positions of the South 
China Sea protagonists suggest little likelihood of acquiescence to inde-
pendent international mediation.
 Attempts to set aside boundary delimitation disputes and under-
take cooperative oil and gas exploration have not been very successful. 
A Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the 
Agreement Area in the South China Sea between China, Vietnam and 
the Philippines national oil companies in 2005 was initially greeted as 
25 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 
November 2002, 11 September 2012, < http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>.
26 Ibid., the ASEAN Declaration does not include Taiwan, a key participant in South 
China Sea territorial claims and oil exploration activities.
27 ASEAN, Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers 20/07/2012, viewed 12 
September 2012, <http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/mofa/default.aspx?id=3206>.
28 Ian Storey, “Little hope of effective South China Sea conduct code”, South China 
Morning Post, 27 July 2012.
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offering much promise.29 However, little cooperative activity has been 
reported; the agreement has mainly served to underscore and inflame 
existing territorial disputes.30
Regional Disaster Response Mechanisms
There are numerous regional mechanisms in the Asia Pacific that engage 
in aspects of disaster management and emergency response, either as 
their key focus or as part of broader regional engagement. Principal 
among these are ASEAN, ARF, EAS, the Asia-Pacific Economic Com-
munity (APEC)31 and SAARC. There are also sub-regional entities and 
organisations within the larger groupings focusing on one or more dis-
aster management elements.32 Most regional countries have established 
national disaster management mechanisms supported by variable levels 
of associated legislation, regulations and resources; including access to 
military capabilities.
 The massive scale and frequency of natural disasters resulting from 
extreme weather events and seismic activity, and the underdeveloped 
status of many Asia Pacific nations, has resulted in national and regional 
disaster response and recovery resources often being found wanting. 
Resources were deployed from around the world and the region in 
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, Media Release, “Oil 
companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed agreement on South 
China Sea cooperation”, 15 March 2005, viewed 3 March 2011, <http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn>.
30 Ian Storey and Carl Thayer, “The South China Sea dispute: A review of 
developments and their implications since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties”, in K. V. Kesavan and Daljit Singh (Eds.), South and Southeast Asia: 
Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security Challenges (2010), 57–72, 
viewed 15 January 2011, <http://www.scribd.com>.
31 See APEC, Emergency Preparedness, viewed 12 September 2012, <http://www.
apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-
Cooperation/Working-Groups/Emergency-Preparedness.aspx>.
32 Examples of regional non-government disaster coordination and training entities 
include: the Asian Disaster Response & Cooperation Network, the Secretariat 
is based in Malaysia, <http://www.adrrn.net/ >; Asian Disaster Preparedness 
Center (ADPC), based in Thailand, <http://www.adpc.net/2012/>; and the Asian 
Disaster Reduction Center, based in Japan, <http://www.adrc.asia/>.
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response to the December 2004 Asian tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 
including large scale military support from India, the United States, 
Australia and many other countries.33 In May 2008, when Cyclone Nargis 
devastated much of the Irrawaddy Delta area in Myanmar/Burma and 
caused tens of thousands of deaths and suffering for millions, interna-
tional humanitarian assistance efforts were blocked and hampered by 
the Burmese government and military regime.34 In both cases, as in many 
others, the inadequacies of national disaster response mechanisms and 
capabilities were exposed. Few Asia Pacific countries have the independ-
ent capability to deal with disasters on land and even fewer with disasters 
that will originate from offshore oil and gas incidents at sea.
 There are practical regional cooperative initiatives in place designed 
to help respond to the many natural disasters that beset the Asia Pacific. 
For example, the 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response (AADMER),35 which entered into force on 
24 December 200936 urges parties to “take appropriate measures to 
identify disaster risks in its respective territories covering, among 
others, the following aspects: natural and human-induced hazards; risk 
assessment; monitoring of vulnerabilities; and disaster management 
capacities”.37 An ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assis-
tance for disaster management known as “the AHA Centre”38 has been 
33 Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Löfgren and Tim 
Randall, “The effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response”, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Report, 2008, viewed 13 
September 2012, Annex C, pp. 86–105, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/236476AD3257088DC125741000474F20-sipri_mar2008.pdf>.
34 Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Cyclone Nargis and the 
responsibility to protect Myanmar/Burma Briefing No. 2”, 16 May 2008, viewed 
12 September 2012, <http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Burma_Brief2.
pdf>.
35 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
(AADMER), Vientiane, 26 July 2005, viewed 15 January 2011, <http://www.
aseansec.org> .
36 See <http://www.aseanpostnargiskm.org/home-mainmenu-1 >, viewed 13 
September 2012, for information about AADMER and its implementation.
37 Ibid., Article 5.
38 Ibid., Article 20.
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established in Jakarta. AADMER has continued to evolve and Standard 
Operating Procedures for joint disaster response operations (SASOP) 
were promulgated in November 2009.39
 The inadequate response to Cyclone Nargis acted as a catalyst to 
move AADMER forward.40 The AADMER Work Programme 2010–
201541 deals extensively with disaster risk management including Preven-
tion and Mitigation, Preparedness and Response, Recovery and the pro-
motion of international engagement.42 AADMER does not make specific 
mention of offshore disaster management and emergency response;43 
somewhat surprising given the quintessentially maritime nature of the 
ASEAN region. AADMER provides for Parties to seek assistance to 
deal with events within their territory, which potentially could include 
territorial seas, and could possibly extend to exclusive economic zones 
although this is unclear from the documentation.
 The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), established under 
United Nations auspices and based in Bangkok, Thailand with outreach 
centres in some other Asian countries, is designed to assist Asian coun-
tries in formulating their policies and developing their capabilities in 
all aspects of disaster management; they provide training, advice and 
39 ASEAN, SASOP Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby 
Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response 
Operations, Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, November 2009.
40 ASEAN, Charting a New Course: ASEAN-UN Post-Nargis Partnership, ASEAN 
Secretariat 2010, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://www.asean.org/resources/
publications>.
41 ASEAN, Asean Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 
Work Programme for 2010–2015, viewed 10 September 2012, <http://www.
asean.org/resources/publications>.
42 Ibid., p. 7. “Foster closer partnerships and more collaborative initiatives with 
partner organisations, international organisations, civil society, academia, and the 
military, among others, to promote disaster resilience in ASEAN from regional to 
local levels”
43 Ibid., Annexes 1 and 2, pp. 105–107 and 109. In the type and frequency of 
disasters listings no mention is made offshore incidents like oil spills and Search 
and Rescue appears to only be considered for incidents on land.
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conduct theme programs. 44 Implementation is left to individual coun-
tries. There is no mention of offshore disaster management in the ADPC 
strategic plan or programs.45
 In a similar vein, SAARC has been progressing cooperative frame-
works for dealing with natural disasters in South Asia. A SAARC Disaster 
Management Centre (SDMC) was established in New Delhi in October 
2006 and in November 2011 a SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response 
to Natural Disasters was signed, with India becoming the first SAARC 
member state to ratify it on 21 August 2012.46
 There are some long-standing regional arrangements in place that 
deal with marine pollution. For example, the “Project on Oil Spill Pre-
paredness and Response in the ASEAN Seas Area” (ASEAN-OSPAR 
Project),47 has the aim of improving the capability of ASEAN countries to 
deal with large-scale oil and hazardous and noxious substance spill inci-
dents in the ASEAN region. It is based on the ASEAN Oil Spill Response 
Action Plan (OSRAP). ASEAN-OSPAR pools ASEAN oil spill response 
resources. In 1994, an ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pol-
lution was agreed to “enhance cooperation to manage natural resources 
and control transboundary pollution within ASEAN, to develop a 
regional early warning and response system, and to improve the capac-
ity of member countries in these areas”.48 It provides for assistance to be 
called upon from external sources like Australia and Japan; it includes 
44 ADPC was originally established as an outreach centre of the Asian Institute 
of Technology after a feasibility study conducted jointly by two agencies of the 
United Nations, the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator 
(current the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and the 
World Meteorological Organization in January 1986, viewed 24 January 2013, 
<http://www.adpc.net/2012/?>.
45 See “adpc strategy 2020: Towards a Safer Asia Building resilience through 
innovation and partnerships”, viewed 24 January 2013, <http://www.adpc.
net/2012/?>.
46 SAARC, “India ratifies the Agreement on Natural Disasters”, 21 August 2012, 
viewed 13 September 2012, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>.
47 ASEAN-OSPAR Project, “Project on oil spill preparedness and response in the 
ASEAN seas area”, <http://www.nmc.com.sg> (15 January 2011).
48 ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution, 21 October 1994, <http://
www.aseansec.org> (15 January 2011).
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“transboundary ship borne pollution”49 but makes no mention of pollu-
tion from offshore oil and gas installations. There would appear to be 
potential for these arrangements to be extended to cover such incidents.
Recommendations to Progress Regional Cooperation
Despite the initiatives outlined above, there remains a concerning lack 
of regional cooperative arrangements designed to deal with large scale 
offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents. Regional states, through 
regional consultative entities like the ARF, EAS, APEC and SAARC, need 
to consider formulating enhanced regional cooperative arrangements. 
Such arrangements should address the following key areas:
•	 maritime safety, security and environmental protection coopera-
tive activities, including dialogue and consultation;
•	 consistent and cooperative approaches to offshore oil and gas 
safety and security risk management;
•	 maritime disaster response and emergency management;
•	 regional maritime search and rescue, including training and 
exercises;
•	 establishing regional standards on marine pollution, including 
dumping and environment/ seabed management (this could take 
the form of a treaty as is the case in many other regions);
•	 establishing a regional approach to decommissioned platforms;
•	 creating cooperative regional environmental disaster response 
measures, procedures, standards, training and equipment 
reserves;
•	 developing consistent cooperative approaches, standards and 
procedures between governments and industry involved in the 
offshore oil and gas sector; and
•	 benchmarking against global best practices to underpin improve-
ments to regional, national and industry arrangements.
49 Ibid.
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Annex A – CSCAP Memorandum No. 16 Safety and 
Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installatiions
Introduction
The number of offshore oil and gas installations in the waters of the Asia 
Pacific region continues to grow rapidly, driven by the increasing demand 
for energy. Significant activities, including surveying and thousands of 
exploratory drillings, are underway or planned. This is expected to result 
in hundreds of new operational offshore oil and gas facilities.
 Major safety incidents or attacks on the security of offshore facilities 
would have wider security, economic and environmental implications 
for the Asia Pacific region. There have been many incidents involving 
offshore installations elsewhere in the world. Response and recovery 
efforts have required considerable application of resources and a high 
level of cooperation between neighboring countries. The increasing 
risks of similar incidents occurring in the Asia Pacific region must be 
recognized. Cooperative arrangements for the prevention, response and 
recovery from offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents in the 
Asia Pacific region need to be reviewed and further developed.
 This Memorandum identifies emerging safety and security issues and 
potential consequences due to Asia Pacific offshore oil and gas prolifera-
tion. Risk mitigation and treatment options to be further explored and 
developed, as a matter of priority, are recommended. Regional govern-
ments need to give close attention to ensuring that industry, state and 
region-wide cooperative measures for the safety and security of offshore 
oil and gas installations are adequate. Regional disaster and emergency 
prevention, response and recovery measures also require urgent atten-
tion.
 
Emerging Issues and Potential Consequences
Emerging issues with potential safety and security consequences that 
arise from offshore oil and gas activity in the Asia Pacific region include: 
 1. The proliferation of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploi-
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tation activities coupled with increasing maritime traffic in the 
region is resulting in increased maritime user intensity in some 
areas. Potential consequences include: 
a. The likelihood of safety incidents is increased (e.g. collisions, 
oil spills, human errors, technological malfunctions, natural 
hazards); 
b. The likelihood of terrorist attacks on the global energy sector, 
although low, remains. The increased risk to regional facili-
ties must be considered, including non-conventional attacks 
intended to disrupt (e.g. cyber-attacks); 
c. The likelihood of law and order at sea issues is increased (e.g. 
piracy/armed robbery); and 
d. The likelihood of unauthorized activities in close proximity 
to installations (e.g. fishing within safety zones) is increasing, 
presenting safety and security risks. 
 2. There is uneven adoption, compliance and interpretation of 
international regimes across the region. Annex A lists relevant 
international conventions, regional instruments and other docu-
ments. Annex B presents a summary of ratification or accession 
of key treaties by ARF/CSCAP Member States. Potential conse-
quences include:
a. The possibility for misunderstandings between states in the 
region is increased; 
b. Cooperative regional, national and industry prevention, 
response and recovery arrangements and measures are 
unnecessarily complicated and inefficient due to inconsistent 
approaches; and 
c. Some regional states reputations as good citizens of the world 
are diminished by low levels of adoption and compliance. 
 3. The risk of catastrophic incidents resulting from natural hazards 
(e.g. typhoons/cyclones) and man-made accidents that may have 
regional as well as national implications is increasing. Potential 
consequences include: 
a. The likelihood of massive environmental disasters that tran-
scend national boundaries is increased; 
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b. Food security may be impacted by massive marine pollution; 
c. Significant financial consequences may be incurred (e.g. 
increasing insurance premiums, clean-up costs, compensa-
tion, impact on world oil and gas prices); and 
d. Damage to the reputation of regional states and industry, par-
ticularly if prevention, response and recovery arrangements 
are found to be wanting.
 4. Industry, national and regional cooperative measures to deal with 
large scale offshore oil and gas safety and security incidents are 
generally not well developed. Potential consequences include: 
a. The lack of capacity to prevent, respond and recover from 
security attacks presents significant vulnerabilities; 
b. Cooperative arrangements for maritime safety and security, 
including maritime traffic, are impacted; 
c. Search and rescue, disaster management and emergency 
response arrangements and measures are impacted; and 
d. Regional capacities to deal with catastrophic accidents, 
including emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
arrangements are unlikely to be adequate. 
 5. The prospect of decommissioned offshore oil and gas platforms 
is increasing as older platforms near end of life. This will sig-
nificantly increase in the future with the proliferation of new 
installations. Potential consequences include: 
a. Hazards to navigation and other uses of the area will increase; 
and 
b. Environmental hazards will increase. 
Risk Mitigation and Treatment Options 
Risk mitigation and treatment options recommended for further develop-
ment to address emerging offshore oil and gas safety and security issues 
in the Asia Pacific region are as follows: 
 1. A regular and comprehensive assessment of the offshore oil and 
gas safety and security risk profile in the region is required. ISO 
31000:2009 Risk management - Principles and guidelines pro-
vides useful guidance and is widely used by industry. Adopting 
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a consistent approach to risk management would help to ensure 
that risk treatment, prevention, response and recovery arrange-
ments and capabilities are in place and practiced before major 
incidents occur. 
 2. Regional states and consultative entities, like the ARF, are 
strongly encouraged to develop enhanced regional cooperative 
arrangements to include the following: 
a. Maritime safety and security cooperative activities, including 
dialogue and consultation; 
b. Disaster response and emergency management; 
c. Regional search and rescue, including training and exercises; 
d. Establish regional standards on marine pollution including 
dumping and environment/seabed management (this could 
take the form of a treaty as is already the practice in many 
other maritime regions); 
e. Establish a regional approach to decommissioned platforms; 
f. Regional environmental disaster response measures; and 
g. Reference global best practices to improve regional arrange-
ments. 
 3. Regional governments are urged to ratify, observe and effectively 
implement international conventions, regional instruments and 
other documents as a matter of priority. Matters requiring atten-
tion include: 
a. 1982 UNCLOS; 
b. 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol, 2005 SUA Protocol; 
c. 1972 London Convention and 1996 Protocol for Prevention 
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste; 
d. 1974 SOLAS, including the ISPS Code; 
e. OPRC 1990; 
f. IMO Resolution A.672 (16) Guidelines for the removal of 
offshore installations; 
g. 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue; 
h. 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea; and 
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i. 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emer-
gency Response. 
 4. Encourage government-industry cooperative partnerships with 
appropriate sharing of responsibilities for prevention, response 
and recovery with the following considerations: 
a. The responsibilities of governments and industry need to 
be fully addressed so that individual and shared regional, 
national and industry obligations are recognized and evalu-
ated to ensure that there are no gaps; 
b. Effective cooperation and consistency is required regionally, 
nationally and with industry in dealing with decommissioned 
platforms; 
c. Disaster and emergency response arrangements; and 
d. Security cooperation (to deal with issues like fishing within 
platform safety zones). 
Previous CSCAP Memorandums 
The previous relevant CSCAP Memorandums are: 
•	 CSCAP Memorandum No. 4 – Guidelines for Regional Maritime 
Cooperation (December 1997)
•	 CSCAP Memorandum No.5 – Cooperation for Law and Order at 
Sea (February 2001) CSCAP Memorandum No. 6 – The Practice 
of the Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific (December 2002) 
•	 CSCAP Memorandum No.8 - The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade 
and the Maritime Regime in the Asia Pacific (April 2004) 
•	 CSCAP Memorandum No.13 - Guidelines for Maritime Coopera-
tion in Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas 
of the Asia Pacific (June 2008) 
Recommendations
It is recommended that this Memorandum be put forward as a CSCAP 
initiative for consideration by the ARF. Specifically, given the emerging 
priority of the issues addressed, it is recommended that ARF considera-
tion of the issues raised in the Memorandum be included in the ARF 
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work plan on maritime security, which will be prepared for endorsement 
by ARF ministers in July 2011. As a first step toward inclusion in the ARF 
work plan, the Memorandum could be presented for discussion at the 
next ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security in Japan 
on 14-15 February 2011. A dedicated ARF desk-top exercise or workshop, 
for fuller consideration of the issues and options, may also be worthy of 
consideration, upon inclusion in the ARF work plan. 
Annexes:
 A. Offshore Oil and Gas safety and Security – List of Relevant 
International Conventions, Regional Instruments and Other 
Documents 
 B. Table of Ratification or Accession of Treaties by ARF/CSCAP 
Member States
Annex A
Offshore Oil and Gas safety and Security – List of Relevant International 
Conventions, Regional Instruments and Other Documents 
 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS), adopted 10 December 1982 (entered into force 
generally 16 November 1994). Relevant articles include: 56, 60, 
74, 98, 100, 123, 138, 194, 197, 208 and 214. 
 2. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS), adopted 1 November 1974 (entered into force gener-
ally 25 May 1980) 
 3. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, 
adopted 27 April 1979 (entered into force generally 22 June 1985) 
 4. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988), adopted 10 March 
1988 (entered into force generally 1 March 1992) 
 5. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988(1988 
SUA Protocol), adopted 10 March 1988 (entered into force gen-
erally 1 March 1992) 
 6. 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 SUA 
Protocols) (entered into force generally 28 July 2010) 
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 7. Amendments to the Annex to the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 Contained in Resolutions 
1, 2, 6 and 7 of The Conference of Contracting Governments 
and including The International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code, London, 12 December 2002 (entered into force 1 
July 2004) 
 8. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
Wastes and Other Matters 1972, adopted 29 December 1972 
(entered into force generally 30 August 1975) 
 9. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, adopted 
7 November 1996 (entered into force generally 24 March 2006) 
 10. International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion from Ships 1973, adopted 2 November 1973 (entered into 
force generally 2 October 1983), amended by Protocol of 1978 
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution from Ships 1973 (‘MARPOL 73/78’), adopted 
17 February 1978 (entered into force generally 2 October 1983) 
 11. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation 1990 (‘OPRC 1990’), adopted 30 
November 1990 (entered into force generally 13 May 1995) 
 12. Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installa-
tions and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone 1989, (1989) IMO Resolution A.672(16)
 13. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage result-
ing from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources 1977 (‘CLEE’), adopted 1 May 1977 (not generally in 
force) 
 14. ISO 31000:2009 Risk management - Principles and guidelines 
published 13 November 2009 
 15. ASEAN – China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea, 2002 
 16. ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response, 2005
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Chapter 6
rEGiONaL risK rEaLitiEs
iS A diSASteR iNevitAble?
Offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activity is boom-ing in the Asia Pacific region. The global thirst for energy, par-ticularly for oil and gas, is driving regional and extra-regional 
powers to search for and access hydrocarbons in deeper and more remote 
waters; and in the case of the South and East China Seas, increasingly 
crowded and strategically important waters. The pursuit of individual 
national and commercial interests to exploit offshore resources is gen-
erating the convergence of wider interests, and risks to those interests, 
between often competing regional littoral states.
 Regional actors in the Asia Pacific would be advised to consider 
developing collective arrangements and mechanisms to protect mutual 
objectives and interests. Possibly inadequate safety and security risk 
management and regulation in the offshore oil and gas sector combined 
with jurisdictional uncertainties and the escalating possibility of regional 
conflict over offshore resources increases the risks and will result in 
sub-optimal and perhaps disastrous outcomes for all interested parties. 
Convergent interests in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
means that collaboration between states and other actors, particularly 
regional cooperative entities and the oil and gas industry, is necessary, 
presents opportunities that are likely to be mutually beneficial, and 
therefore logical. This circumstance provides an opportunity, a potential 
catalyst, for wider regional maritime security, economic and environ-
mental collaboration that has so far not been significantly explored. The 
strategic interests of regional states and other actors will be enhanced by 
pursuing cooperative activity at sea; they will remain diminished until 
this occurs.
 The risk-based approach to the offshore oil and gas industry in the 
Asia Pacific employed in this analysis has proven useful in highlighting the 
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many factors that combine to present largely uncalculated and unmitigated 
cumulative and aggregate risks to safety and security. Key risk factors, 
response options and recommended actions are summarised below.
Risk Factors
There are a range of factors that need to be considered either by indi-
vidual states or in concert through regional entities, and in collaboration 
with industry, that should shape risk judgments in the offshore oil and 
gas sector. These factors include:
Strategic risk context
 1. Offshore oil and gas activity in the Asia Pacific is rapidly expand-
ing with massive investment in new fields and large numbers of 
new wells. The increasing intensity of activity in the medium 
term means that the likelihood of incidents is increasing.
 2. The search for oil and gas into deeper and more remote waters is 
increasing risk by pushing the boundaries of technology, opera-
tional experience and technical extraction competence.
 3. Powerful political and commercial pressures to access oil and gas 
are at play that drive governments and industry to either ignore 
or accept significant risks in that pursuit.
 4. The efficacy of regulatory arrangements have been brought to 
question in numerous international incidents; getting the balance 
right and applying appropriate resources and controls to ensure 
government-industry rights, obligations and responsibilities are 
met is highly problematic with many uncertainties.
 5. Regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure ade-
quate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take unilateral 
steps to dramatically increase safety, including self-policing 
mechanisms to supplement government enforcement.
 6. International experience has shown that the technology, laws 
and regulations, practices and capabilities for responding to 
the environmental impacts of oil spills lag behind the real risks 
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associated with large scale and high intensity offshore oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation; there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Asia Pacific situation is any different.
 7. Scientific understanding of the marine environment in sensitive 
oceanic and coastal areas has been found to be inadequate in 
other parts of the world, as has comprehension of the human 
and natural impacts of oil spills; there is little evidence to suggest 
that the Asia Pacific will be any different.
 8. In the Asia Pacific case jurisdictional uncertainty, deep-seated 
traditional distrust and strategic competition promotes secrecy 
and undermines the likelihood of cooperative activity between 
states to prevent, respond to and recover from incidents.
Increasing risks
 9. The rising intensity of sea use activities in much of the Asia 
Pacific, including shipping, fishing, tourism and other sea 
surface, water column and seabed exploitative activities in 
and around areas where oil and gas activity is also occurring, 
increases the risk of accidents and incidents.
 10. Offshore oil and gas activity in the Asia Pacific largely occurs in 
waters that are subject to extreme weather events and destructive 
seismic activity; weather induced incidents in other parts of the 
world have resulted in loss of life and damage to the environ-
mental.
 11. There are mounting concerns of armed conflict at sea between 
protagonists in parts of the Asia Pacific; while the likelihood of 
major regional or state on state conflict remains low the prospect 
of minor skirmishes that could impact on the safety and security 
of oil and gas installations and vessels is real and increasing. 
Many regional states are investing in qualitative and quantitative 
improvements to their maritime forces, which increase uncer-
tainty about security intentions and the potential consequences 
of conflict at sea.
Chapter 6
Regional Risk Realities: Is a Disaster Inevitable?
89
 12. Incidents arising from law and order at sea problems, including 
maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery, must also be 
considered in the Asia Pacific region with the impact on associ-
ated vessels more likely than major oil and gas installations that 
have proven to be difficult targets.
Consequences are significant
 13. Offshore oil and gas incidents generate major negative human, 
environmental and economic security outcomes that are likely 
to affect other industries like fishing and tourism, and impact 
marine ecosystems.
 14. Offshore oil and gas incidents will often have significant con-
sequences for neighbouring littoral nations; this concern is 
magnified in the crowded waters of the Asia Pacific, amplified 
by boundary delimitation disputes and uncertain jurisdictional 
controls and responsibilities in some cases.
 15. Hazards arising from decommissioned offshore oil and gas instal-
lations, including submerged wellheads, will grow as increasing 
numbers of wells are exhausted and abandoned.
 16. The low incidence of accession or ratification of Asia Pacific 
nations to international treaties designed to facilitate individual 
and cooperative activity in vital areas including maritime safety, 
security and environmental protection combined with the lack 
of regional cooperative agreements for matters like marine pol-
lution, including dumping and environment/seabed manage-
ment reduce the likelihood of individual states and cooperative 
prevention, response and recovery arrangements.
 17. While onshore disaster response arrangements and capabilities 
in individual states and cooperatively have received considerable 
attention in recent years under the auspices of regional bodies 
like ARF, EAS, APEC, SAARC and ASEAN little attention has so 
far been paid to disaster response at sea, particularly regarding 
offshore oil and gas.
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Risk Response Options
In the Asia Pacific region, industry, national and regional cooperative 
measures to deal with large scale offshore oil and gas safety and secu-
rity incidents are often not well developed. Potential consequences 
that present significant vulnerabilities include: the lack of capacity and 
coordination regimes to prevent, respond to and recover from security 
attacks; cooperative arrangements for maritime safety and security, 
including maritime traffic, are underdeveloped; search and rescue, dis-
aster management and emergency response arrangements and measures 
are not adequately developed; and regional capacities to deal with the 
environmental consequences of catastrophic accidents are unlikely to 
be adequate.
 There is little evidence so far that regional governments and industry 
participants are paying attention to the rising, cumulative risks to safety 
and security that increased offshore oil and gas activity is generating. 
Similar to the Gulf of Mexico case in the United States, regional states 
appear to be consumed by the rush to claim and exploit as much of 
the valuable resources as possible. While the regulatory context and 
effectiveness will vary across Asia Pacific maritime domains experience 
elsewhere in the world has shown that arrangements are often found to 
be inadequate.
Urgent Actions Required
As a matter of urgency, Asia Pacific regional cooperative bodies and 
individual states, in concert with industry partners, should consider 
pursuing the following actions:
 1. Offshore oil and gas safety and security should feature as a major 
and discrete agenda item with regional safety, security, economic, 
environmental and disaster response regional cooperative 
bodies. Entities like ARF, EAS, APEC, ASEAN and SAARC, and 
relevant subordinate agencies, should commission independent 
expert working groups directed to review and report recommen-
dations and options to develop regional cooperative measures.
 2. A significant and essential initial activity of such working groups 
should be to commission strategic, all-factors offshore oil and 
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gas benchmark risk assessments to establish objective bases for 
individual state and cooperative risk management initiatives.
 3. UNCLOS Articles 122 and 123 provide an international legisla-
tive foundation for targeted regional cooperative and national 
initiatives that should be acted upon, noting the majority of Asia 
Pacific states covered by this review have ratified UNCLOS (see 
Chapter 5) and the South China Sea is generally recognised by 
littoral states as a semi-enclosed sea (see Chapter 3).
 4. States should, as a matter of priority, accede to relevant mari-
time and marine safety, security and environmental protection 
conventions and protocols. Establishing associated national 
legislation, regulations and capabilities, and regional cooperative 
arrangements, would follow.
 5. Specifically, regional states should establish and where they 
already exist, enhance regional cooperative regimes to deal 
with:
a. maritime search and rescue;
b. marine environmental protection including pollution, dump-
ing and decommissioning of offshore installations;
c. maritime safety and security arrangements to include inci-
dents at sea protocols;
d. establishing common, best practice approaches to offshore 
oil and gas safety and security regulation, to include industry 
engagement, this may include establishing regional govern-
ment-industry cooperative agencies to provide advice and 
coordination;
e. develop individual state and collective offshore arrangements 
and capabilities for disaster management to include preven-
tion of, recovery from and response to offshore oil and gas 
incidents; and
f. enhancing and sharing scientific information that include 
marine science, oceanographic, hydrographic, seismic, and 
meteorology data in order to better understand and therefore 
prevent and prepare responses and recovery arrangements to 
deal with the environmental impacts of incidents.
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 6. Encourage regional states to use international regimes and 
mechanisms, like UNCLOS and the International Court of Jus-
tice, to resolve or agree to set aside maritime boundary delimita-
tion disputes in the interests of mutually beneficial economic, 
security, safety and environmental outcomes.
 7. Encourage all parties involved in offshore oil and gas safety and 
security, including states and industry, to adopt internationally 
recognised and proven risk management approaches. Effective 
risk management requires partnerships between the regulator 
and those being regulated, between government and industry, 
where each partner performs its role diligently and with integrity.
Concluding Remarks
As the Commissioners’ charged with investigating the Deepwater Hori-
zon and West Atlas disasters concluded it is not a matter of if major 
disasters will occur in the offshore oil and gas sector but when; there is 
every reason to extend those judgments to the Asia Pacific. Given rapidly 
rising offshore oil and gas activity in the Asia Pacific, the extent of the 
safety and security uncertainties and the lack of cooperative arrange-
ments to prevent, respond to and recover from incidents, an uncomfort-
able conclusion must be drawn: offshore oil and gas disasters in the Asia 
Pacific are inevitable. The only questions that remain to be answered are 
where, when and what the scale of the disasters will be, and how effective 
response and recovery arrangements will prove to be.
 The onus lies with regional governments, cooperative entities and 
industry, supported by extra-regional governments with interests at stake, 
to ensure that the risks are fully understood and that appropriate mitigation 
arrangements are put in place. Industry, national and regional cooperative 
mechanisms, arrangements, protocols, equipments and training to prevent, 
respond to and recovery from incidents need to be prepared and tested before 
major incidents occur. Unfortunately, realistic and uncomfortable expectations 
must be faced. Sovereignty concerns and distrust between national govern-
ments combined with greed for access to resources and commercial benefit 
are likely to remain dominant; unmitigated risks will continue to mount and 
the likelihood of offshore oil and gas safety and security disasters in the Asia 
Pacific, with major consequences, will continue to rise.
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